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THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE REVOLUTION IN
CORPORATE LAW: A PRIMER ON EMERGING
CORPORATE ENTITIES IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES AND THE CASE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION
ROBERT T. ESPOSITO
ABSTRACT
Remarkably, in the face of a global recession, the social enterprise sector
continued to experience extraordinary growth in both financial support and the
number of newly authorized corporate entities aimed at social entrepreneurs
who seek to use the power of business to simultaneously achieve profit and
social or environmental benefits. This Article highlights recent developments in
the social enterprise movement in Europe and the United States and focuses on
the emergence of a surprisingly broad range of newly authorized corporate
entities on both continents in response to the needs of social entrepreneurs.
These include social cooperatives and the community interest company in
Europe, as well as the L3C, the flexible purpose corporation, the social
purpose corporation, and the benefit corporation in the United States. In so
doing, this Article emphasizes the truly international scope of the social
enterprise movement and explains the growing divergence in approaches to
social enterprise between continental Europe and the United States. This
Article suggests that the benefit corporation, which imposes a new duty to
consider stakeholder interests, is currently the most effective vehicle through
which social entrepreneurs can ensure their blended value goals are being
considered and achieved. This Article concludes by responding to critiques of
profit-distribution in social enterprise, making the case for the benefit
corporation, and suggesting some statutory and tax reforms to further foster
the social enterprise revolution.
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INTRODUCTION
I would leave this to the Consideration of all who are concern’d for
their own or their Neighbor’s Temporal Happiness; and I am humbly of
Opinion, that the Country is ripe for many such Friendly Societies, whereby
every Man might help another, without any Disservice to himself.1
An increasing number of voices are calling for a corporate revolution
that promotes socially and environmentally responsible business practices,
and in turn gives sustainable goods and services greater market access.
Business luminaries like Muhammad Yunus,2 Bill Gates,3 and Richard
Branson4 have voiced their frustrations with the predominance of shareholder wealth maximization, and have joined the ranks of long-time sustainability advocates like John Elkington5 in encouraging a new generation
of entrepreneurs to consider stakeholder interests and embrace socially
and environmentally responsible business models. In other words, they
argue that doing good will be good for business.6 Moreover, they submit
1

Benjamin Franklin, Silence Dogood, No. 10, NEW-ENGLAND COURANT, Aug. 13,
1722, at 1, reprinted in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SILENCE DOGOOD, THE BUSY-BODY, AND
EARLY WRITINGS 32–33 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 2002).
2
See MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BUILDING SOCIAL BUSINESS: THE NEW KIND OF CAPITALISM
THAT SERVES HUMANITY’S MOST PRESSING NEEDS xv–xvi (2010). Yunus argues that our
existing theory of capitalism is flawed insofar as it misrepresents human nature, and concludes
that capitalism’s portrayal of human beings as “one-dimensional beings whose only mission is
to maximize profit” represents a “badly distorted picture” because it fails to recognize that
human beings are also driven by selfless motivations. Id. at xv.
3
See Bill Gates, Remarks at the 2008 World Economic Forum: Creative Capitalism
(Jan. 24, 2008) (transcript and video available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/speech
es-commentary/Pages/bill-gates-2008-world-economic-forum-creative-capitalism.aspx).
Gates submits that, in general, people benefit in inverse proportion to their need in a pure
capitalist system and challenges his audience to find ways for businesses and governments to “create measures of what companies are doing to use their power and intelligence to serve a wider circle of people.” Id.
4
RICHARD BRANSON, SCREW BUSINESS AS USUAL 96 (2011) (“One of the more
devastating theories of the 1970s was that no matter what it took to achieve it, the
primary purpose of business was to maximize value for its shareholders. This principle
has led to a variety of social ills where businesses discard employees (at the drop of a
hat), pollute our air and waters, or create short-term gains that are unsustainable.”).
5
John Elkington, co-founder of the international consultancy SustainAbility, is credited
with coining terms like “triple-bottom line” and is recognized as a leading advocate for
sustainable development. For more information, see generally Elkington’s website,
JOHNELKINGTON.COM, http://www.johnelkington.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). See
also JOHN ELKINGTON & PAMELA HARTIGAN, THE POWER OF UNREASONABLE PEOPLE:
HOW SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS CREATE MARKETS THAT CHANGE THE WORLD 1–2 (2008).
6
BRANSON, supra note 4, at 24–25.
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that the recent global financial crisis has brought to bear the shortcomings
of traditional corporate models, and provides an opportunity for serious
reconsideration of corporate governance.7 Most importantly, they have a
growing audience of young social entrepreneurs who want to harness the
power of business to address social and environmental problems.8
Recent data suggests that the market has begun to take these calls for
change seriously; in fact, despite the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression, businesses engaged in socially and environmentally responsible
enterprise now enjoy unprecedented financial support.9 According to a recent report published by the U.S. Social Investment Forum (US-SIF), “assets involved in sustainable and socially responsible investing increased
more than 13 percent”10 from 2007 to 2010, while the broader universe of
professionally managed assets remained stagnant.11 In 2007, 9.4% of total
assets under professional management in the United States were involved in
socially responsible investing.12 In the face of a recession, that figure increased to 12.2%, or $3.07 trillion, by 2010.13 J.P. Morgan estimated that
the ten-year profit potential from such investments ranges between $183
7

See YUNUS, supra note 2, at 29 (suggesting that the current financial crisis provides an
opportunity for “bold experimentation”); see also Marjorie Kelly, Not Just for Profit, 54
STRATEGY+BUSINESS, Feb. 26, 2009, at 4, http://www.strategy-business.com/media/file/e
news-02-26-09.pdf (arguing that the best way to avoid future collapses is to redesign corporate ownership and governance); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social
Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 377 (2009) (opining that the current recession
may give rise to “an open moment when Americans and their lawmakers may be willing to
reconsider the theoretically rigid boundaries between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors”).
See generally Engobo Emeseh et al., Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons
from the Global Financial Crisis?, 11 GERMAN L. J. 230 (2010).
8
David Gergen, The New Engines of Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 20,
2006, at 48 (identifying social enterprise as one of the “hottest movements” among young
people in the United States); see also BRANSON, supra note 4, at 2 (“Just making money,
in order simply to give it away, is out of date. There’s a massive generational shift occurring that will blur the distinction between doing good and doing business.”).
9
See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 327 (2011); Tom Zeller,
Jr., Can Business Do the Job All by Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/03/29/business/energy-environment/29green.html (socially responsible investing
is growing more popular because U.S. institutional investors are increasingly recognizing
that “doing good ... also enhance[s] shareholder value”).
10
SOC. INV. FORUM FOUND., REPORT ON SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN
THE UNITED STATES 8 (2010), http://ussif.org/resources/research/documents/2010Trends
ES.pdf [hereinafter 2010 US-SIF REPORT].
11
Id.
12
Alina Tugend, Picking Stocks That Don’t Sin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17shortcuts.html?pagewanted=print.
13
Id.
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billion and $667 billion.14 The growth of social enterprise is now so pronounced that in 2011, for the first time in its ninety-four-year history,
Forbes Magazine released the “Impact 30,” a list of the world’s leading social entrepreneurs.15
As a result, the legal frustrations of social entrepreneurs who seek to simultaneously pursue profits and social or environmental benefits have taken center
stage. A 2007 poll showed that 71% of social entrepreneurs considered the
choice of entity to be the single greatest challenge for their enterprise,16 reflecting a general dissatisfaction with the for-profit/nonprofit dichotomy offered by
traditional corporate law.17 These frustrations stem from the fact that for-profit
entities are beholden to the overriding influence of profit-maximization at the
expense of social or environmental goals, while nonprofits have charitable
goals as their polestar, but are prohibited from distributing profits.18 This Article focuses on corporate law’s response in both Europe and the United
States to this increasing demand for innovative corporate entities. In doing so,
the author hopes to illustrate two main points: first, that social enterprise is a
truly global movement; and second, that the newly authorized entities lie on a
surprisingly broad spectrum of approaches to social enterprise.
Some commentators have observed that corporate law does not formally enslave all businesses to shareholder wealth maximization, but rather explicitly permits for-profit entities to make significant contributions
to charity.19 Others have contended that the flexible approach desired by
social entrepreneurs is made possible through constituency statutes,20 which
14
J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL RESEARCH, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING ASSET CLASS
6 (2010), http://www.jpmorgan.com/directdoc/impact_investments_nov2010.pdf; see also
William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 822–23 (2012).
15
Helen Coster, Forbes’ List of the Top 30 Social Entrepreneurs, FORBES (Nov. 30,
2011, 11:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/helencoster/2011/11/30/forbes-list-of-the-top
-30-social-entrepreneurs/.
16
ALLEN R. BROMBERGER, PERLMAN & PERLMAN LLP, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A LAWYER’S
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2008), available at http://www.perlmanandperlman.com/publications/arti
cles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf; see also Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social
Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59, 85 (2010) [hereinafter Katz & Page, Role of Social Enterprise].
17
Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011) (“Social entrepreneurs believe social good can
be produced along with profits and desire hybrid forms of organization to smooth a single
enterprise’s path to realizing both goals.”); see also Katz & Page, supra note 16, at 86–93;
Kelley, supra note 7, at 339.
18
See generally Kelley, supra note 7.
19
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 763 (2005).
20
Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship,
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have been enacted in over thirty states.21 In theory these options appear adequate, but in practice, they fall far short of addressing the needs of social entrepreneurs. In reality, profit-maximization continues to dictate business decisions,
and constituency statutes require no material change to business as usual.22
On the other hand, social enterprise entities stand in stark contrast to corporate law’s heretofore passive responses to the demands of social entrepreneurs. These entities straddle the divide between for-profit and nonprofit
and seek to blend the production of shareholder wealth with social and environmental goals under the umbrella of a single entity.23 In looking at recently authorized entities in Europe and the United States, this Article finds
considerable support for the contention that social enterprise is an international movement.24 The thesis here is that while the social enterprise revolution rages on in various sectors of the economy like energy, construction,
and transportation, corporate law is on the precipice of a momentous seachange whose hallmark will be social enterprise entities that consider the
interests of shareholders and stakeholders alike.25
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 634 (2007); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 973–74 (1992).
21
John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework
for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 132–39 (2010).
22
See id. at 134.
23
See Kelley, supra note 7, at 340. In this sense, the author concurs with Kelley’s observation that we are witnessing the emergence of a “fourth sector” of our economy that
encompasses elements of both business and nonprofit sectors. Id.; see also Heerad Sabeti,
The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 99–104 (“With formalization
of the for-benefit structure, we will see the emergence of a fourth sector of the economy,
interacting with but separate from governments, nonprofits, and for-profit businesses.”).
24
Rosemary E. Fei, Beyond Taxation: A Guide to Social Enterprise Vehicles, 22
TAXATION OF EXEMPTS, Jan.-Feb. 2011, at 13–14 (“More so than in many areas of law, social
enterprise is international in practice. Different national legal regimes—themselves in
different stages of development—have responded more or less quickly and in a variety of
ways to the challenge of creating new legal constructs for operating activities that are not quite
business as usual, nor charity as usual, nor even social change as usual.”); see also Alissa
Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a ForBenefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 292–94 (2009) (noting a global trend towards stakeholdercentered corporate governance models). While this Article focuses on social enterprise in the
United States and Europe, social enterprise is not limited to those continents. Some
commentators have observed the beginnings of the social enterprise revolution in Asia. See,
e.g., Rosario Laratta, The Emergence of the Social Enterprise Sector in Japan, 9 INT’L J. CIV.
SOC’Y L. 35, 49 (2011); Rebecca Lee, The Emergence of Social Enterprises in China: The
Quest for Space and Legitimacy, 2 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 79, 84–91 (2009).
25
See Sabeti, supra note 23, at 99.
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But what, exactly, is meant by “social enterprise?” Definitions range from
simply “the use of market-based strategies to promote the public good”26 to
complex factor-based analyses of an organization’s profit distribution and management structure.27 Professors Robert Katz and Antony Page adopt Paul
Light’s definition, to wit: “an organization or venture that achieves its primary
social or environmental mission using business methods, typically by operating
a revenue-generating business.”28 In contrast, in 2002 the U.K. Department of
Trade and Industry published Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success, which
defined social enterprise as “a business with primarily social objectives whose
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.”29 European commentator Jacques Defourny suggests
several criteria to determine the existence of a social enterprise, including “[a]
continuous activity producing goods and/or selling services,” “[a] high degree
of autonomy,” “[a] minimum amount of paid work,” “[a]n explicit aim to benefit the community,” “[a] participatory nature, which involves the various parties
affected by the activity,” and “limited profit distribution.”30
Despite the infancy of social enterprise, much ink has already been spilt
attempting to define it. This Article submits that the distinction between European social enterprise and American social enterprise prevents the crafting
of an internationally acceptable definition. Most European jurisdictions
view social enterprise as an alternative to traditional charities,31 while the
26

Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote
the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578 (2012); see also James J. Fishman, Wrong
Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit Landscape: A Need for New
Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 598 (2007) (defining social enterprise as
“for-profit vehicles committed to philanthropic activity”); Kyle Westaway, Something
Republicans and Democrats Can Agree On: Social Entrepreneurship, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV. (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/something_republicans_and
_democrats_can_agree_on_social_entrepreneurship (defining social enterprise as “marketbased solutions to social and environmental problems”).
27
See Jacques Defourny, Social Enterprise in an Enlarged Europe: Concept and Realities
(1994), available at http://www.emes.net/fileadmin/emes/PDF_files/Articles/Defourny
/Defourny.Soc.ent.CEE.3.06.pdf (excerpt from conference paper).
28
Katz & Page, supra note 16, at 59 (quoting PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2008)) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).
29
DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS 7 (2002),
available at http://www.seeewiki.co.uk/~wiki/images/5/5a/SE_Strategy_for_success.pdf.
30
Defourny, supra note 27, at 9–10. Defourny’s criteria represent an “ideal-type” of social
enterprise, and are not conditions precedent to an entity qualifying as a social enterprise. He
suggests that they should be used as “a tool, somewhat analogous to a compass, which can
help the researchers locate the position of certain entities relative to one another.” Id. at 11.
31
See Jacques Defourny & Marthe Nyssens, Social Enterprise in Europe: Recent Trends
and Developments, 4 SOC. ENTERPRISE J. 202, 204 (2008).
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United States has embraced a broader view of social enterprise as an emerging “fourth sector” of the economy, wherein profit maximization may be
usurped by social or environmental goals.32
In addition, other new and related terms such as “social business,” “social
entrepreneurship,” “impact investing,” and “corporate social responsibility”
are being used with increased frequency in business and legal literature and
merit a brief review. “Social business” is a term coined by Muhammad
Yunus, a renowned economist and the father of the microfinance industry.33
According to Yunus, a social business is either a “non-loss, non-dividend
company devoted to solving a social problem and owned by investors who
reinvest all profits,”34 or “a profit-making company owned by poor people.”35
For Yunus, the defining characteristic of social business is the prohibition on
profit-distribution to wealthy investors.36 In this respect, social business represents a subcategory of social enterprise, which in many cases embraces
profit distribution. “Social entrepreneurship,” in contrast, is a broader term
generally referring to any venture that creates social or environmental benefits.37 Such activities range from corporate social responsibility initiatives to
double- or triple-bottom line investment techniques.38 “Impact investing,” a
form of social entrepreneurship, is also known as “mission investing, responsible investing, double or triple bottom line investing, ethical investing,
sustainable investing, or green investing.”39 These terms are used interchangeably and refer in general to “an investment discipline that considers
environmental, social and corporate governance criteria to generate long-term
competitive financial returns and positive societal impact.”40 Impact investing
is largely fueled by socially responsible investment funds.41 These institutional funds take into account nonfinancial and social benefit considerations when
screening potential investment opportunities by either avoiding companies
engaged in socially or environmentally harmful activities or actively seeking
32

Kelly, supra note 7, at 340.
See generally YUNUS, supra note 2.
34
Id. at 1.
35
Id. at 2.
36
Id.
37
See id. at 4.
38
See Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 203; Kelly, supra note 7, at 339.
39
Sustainable and Responsible Investing Facts, US-SIF, http://ussif.org/resources/sri
guide/srifacts.cfm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
40
2010 US-SIF REPORT, supra note 10, at 13; see also Sustainable and Responsible
Investing Facts, supra note 39.
41
See, e.g., Our Fund, GOOD CAPITAL, http://www.goodcap.net/ourfund.php (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013).
33
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companies engaged in positive pursuits.42 Finally, “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) is a term that has largely defied definition but is loosely based
around notions of voluntary corporate transparency.43 Some commentators
have observed that CSR lacks any identifiable manifestation or consensus on
regulatory enforcement,44 a shortcoming responsible for CSR’s failure to
square voluntary corporate transparency with perceived ethical imperatives.45
While many welcome CSR’s emphasis on corporate transparency, social enterprise and its accompanying emerging entities go much further than CSR’s
malleable, voluntary approach.46
Social enterprise advocates argue that their model of corporate governance will benefit society and the environment, and will also be good for business.47 Early studies appear to confirm this assertion.48 Furthermore, as Professors Katz and Page note, by creating a “fourth sector” of the economy,
social enterprise largely sidesteps the longstanding debate regarding shareholder wealth maximization by offering new entities with blended corporate
purposes.49 Lastly, and most pragmatically, these entities have consistently
received bipartisan political support.50 As Kyle Westaway, founder of the social enterprise boutique firm Westaway Law, explains: “Liberals love [social
enterprise] because it proves that business can be socially and environmentally
42

Kelley, supra note 7, at 358.
See JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30–31 (2006) (discussing
multiple views of CSR and clarifying CSR as distinct from concepts of corporate governance); Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L.
591, 617 (2008) [hereinafter Backer, Moral Obligation] (noting that there is no consensus
on the definition and value of CSR); Jackson, supra note 9, at 325 n.112 (citing CSR
EUROPE, A GUIDE TO CSR IN EUROPE: COUNTRY INSIGHTS BY CSR 2 (Oct. 2009)).
44
Backer, supra note 43, at 617.
45
See ZERK, supra note 43, at 30.
46
See Kelly, supra note 7, at 350–51.
47
See Kerr, supra note 20, at 634–35.
48
BRANSON, supra note 4, at 25 (quoting a FTSE study finding that “companies that
consistently manage and measure their responsible business activities outperformed their
FTSE 350 peers on total shareholder return in seven out of the last eight years”); see also
Kerr, supra note 20, at 634–35.
49
See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011) [hereinafter Page & Katz,
New Corporate Social Responsibility].
50
Kyle Westaway, New York Unanimously Passes Benefit Corporation Bill, SOCENTLAW
(July 6, 2011), http://socentlaw.com/2011/07/new-york-unanimously-passes-benefit-cor
poration-bill (noting that a recent bill authorizing benefit corporations passed in the New
York legislature by a 62-0 vote in the Senate and a 139-0 vote in the Assembly).
43
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responsible. Conservatives love it because it offers the free market, not government, as the solution to social and environmental problems.”51
The benefit corporation is one of the latest developments in the social
enterprise revolution in corporate law. In 2011, benefit corporations statutes
were enacted in five states52 and proposed legislation was introduced in four
others.53 As of March 2013, benefit corporations are authorized in twelve
states and the District of Columbia.54 Furthermore, 2011 also witnessed the
introduction of two additional social enterprise entities—namely, the flexible purpose corporation (FPC) and the social purpose corporation (SPC).55
This Article identifies a number of recently enacted entities in Europe and
the United States and argues that the benefit corporation is currently the most
effective in achieving the blended value goals of the social enterprise movement.56 To that end, Part I provides a background on corporate responsibility
and discusses the failure to effectively regulate the world’s largest corporations.57 Part II introduces the concept of social enterprise from a European
perspective and highlights the differences between continental Europe’s social cooperatives and the U.K.’s Community Interest Company.58 Part III
turns to social enterprise in the United States and identifies several emerging
entities, including low-profit limited liability companies (L3Cs), flexible purpose corporations, social purpose corporations, and benefit corporations.59
51

Id.
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 420D-1 to -13 (2012) (effective July 8, 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11
(West, Westlaw current through L.2012, c. 45 and J.R. No. 1) (effective Mar. 1, 2011);
New York, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (McKinney 2012) (effective Feb. 10,
2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2012); see also Passing Legislation, B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
53
S.B. 11-005, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2011); S.B. 359, 96th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 360, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.B. 4615, 96th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.B. 4616, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S.B. 26, 2011-12 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011); S.B. 433, 195th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.B. 1616,
195th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); see also Passing Legislation, B CORP., supra note 52.
54
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia have all enacted statutes authorizing
benefit corporations. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://www.
benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
55
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2502, et seq. (West 2012); S.H.B. 2239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2012).
56
Kelly, supra note 7, at 10 (arguing that alternative corporate designs “are likely to
prove better adapted to the cultural and ecological demands of the 21st century than the
industrial age models they might one day replace”).
57
See infra Part I.
58
See infra Part II.
59
See infra Part III.
52
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Based on an analysis of emerging social enterprise corporate forms on both
continents, Part IV concludes that the benefit corporation most successfully
integrates the flexibility and accountability required for social enterprise’s
blended value goals.60 Part IV also addresses some critiques of profitdistribution in social enterprise and suggests possible reforms for future benefit corporation legislation.61
I. A REVIEW OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION
In the 1930s, Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd pioneered the field of
corporate governance scholarship; indeed, many find the genesis of the modern debate surrounding corporate responsibility in the 1931–1932 issues of
the Harvard Law Review.62 Berle advanced a trustee model in which the corporation’s directors acted as trustees of corporate property on behalf of the
shareholder-beneficiaries.63 Berle’s trustee model is generally seen as the
forefather of contractarian shareholder-primacy.64 On the other hand, Dodd
argued that corporations were economic institutions, “which ha[d] a social
service as well as a profit-making function.”65 In this sense, Dodd was the
predecessor of progressive “communitarian” theories of corporate governance.66 However, as some commentators have observed, the legal debate has
60

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
62
Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931), and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365–66 (1932), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932).
For a more thorough history of the debate, see generally Bainbridge, supra note 20; Page
& Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1354–61.
63
See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 7 (1932).
64
Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1356; see also
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 444 n.6 (2001); Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 972 (“Berle contended that ...
the board of directors should operate the corporation for the sole benefit of the shareholders.”); cf. Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1357–58
(emphasizing that Berle’s views evolved over time, and that by 1954, Berle had expressed a
preference for a more communitarian model of corporate governance).
65
Dodd, supra note 62, at 1148; see also Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 972–73 (“Dodd
... saw shareholders as absentee owners whose interests can be subjugated to those of other
corporate constituencies and those of society at large.”).
66
In an attempt to broaden the legal literature beyond traditional neoclassical economic
analysis, advocates of progressive corporate law adopted a multidisciplinary understanding
of corporate law. See generally Joel Seligman, Foreword to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
ix (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). In doing so, proponents of progressive corporate law
61
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been spinning its wheels since the 1930s.67 Indeed, more than eight decades
later, most commentators acknowledge the failure of the legal debate to resolve these competing interpretations of corporate responsibility.68
While the legal debate remained relatively stagnant, multinational corporations69 (MNCs) continued to grow in size and influence.70 Indeed, MNCs now
challenged shareholder primacy. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra, at 35, 36 (contending that “market
theories define efficiency too narrowly and that efficiency cannot be separated from
concepts of social justice and normative goals”); David Millon, Communitarianism in
Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW, supra, at 1, 1 (“[Progressives] ha[ve] challenged corporate law’s traditional commitment to the shareholder primacy principle ... [catalyzed by] concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur as a result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy
principle.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW, supra, at 185, 187 (criticizing contractarian models of corporate governance as
“necessarily limit[ing] the room available for trust,” which in turn encourages parties to act
entirely out of self-interest and “ultimately damages the fabric of a community”).
67
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,
902–03 (1997) (“In the 1930s, we had the Berle-Dodd debate. In the 1950s, Berle and
others revisited the issue. In the 1970s, there was a major fracas over corporate social responsibility. Finally, today we have the nonshareholder constituency debate.... [E]ach iteration adopts a new terminology, focuses on a slightly different facet of the problem, and develops some new ideas. But, all-in-all, we have been here before.” (footnotes omitted)); see
also Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1360–61.
68
See Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics
by Modern Publicly Held Corporations—A Critical Assessment, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 66, at 281 (“This controversy regarding corporate goals and stakeholder
interests has spanned most of the twentieth century.”); Page & Katz, supra note 49, at 1361
(“[A]lthough CSR may have good ideas about corporate behavior, it has generally failed to
produce meaningful large-scale legal reform.”); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate
Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L.
REV. 77, 78 (2002). But see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder
Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (arguing that there has been “some intellectual progress” in the area of corporate responsibility).
69
The author acknowledges that the definition of the term “multinational” has evolved since
it was coined by David E. Lilienthal in 1960. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 5 (2d ed. 2007) (quoting D.K. Fieldhouse, The Multinational: A
Critique of a Concept, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9, 10
(Alice Teichova et al. eds., 1986)). For the purposes of this Article, the author adopts the
OECD’s definition of “multinational,” which emphasizes the degree to which one entity
exerts control and influence over other entities located in different jurisdictions. See id. at
52–53; ZERK, supra note 43, at 51 (observing that most general-purpose definitions of
multinational now emphasize relationships of control instead of ownership relationships
between entities).
70
See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Introduction: Transnational Corporations Revisited, 18
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 601, 606 (2011).
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have revenues that exceed the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many developing countries, allowing them to exert considerable economic and political
pressure on governments.71 Furthermore, as Peter Muchlinski observes, the
recent trend in mature MNCs has been one towards heterarchy, not hierarchy, encouraging the geographic spread of functions across international
borders.72 It is this increase in transnational and transjurisdictional operations,73 working in concert with a shareholder-centric model of corporate
governance, which drives MNCs to exploit looser environmental and labor
regulations in developing countries.74
In response, the international community made attempts to regulate these
organizations and hold them accountable for their negative social and environmental outputs.75 Recent examples of these efforts fall under the umbrella of
CSR,76 achieved through charity funds set aside by a for-profit corporation
for good works in local communities,77 or through “community programs,
or holistic decision making” that align with the corporation’s profit-making
purpose.78 CSR advocates maintain that it presents an effective alternative
71

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 187–88 (2006); Issachar
Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can Corporate Social Responsibility Do for Climate
Change?, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 527, 531–32 (2011); see also Gralf-Peter Calliess,
supra note 70, at 613–14 (2011) (discussing Horst Eidenmuller’s observations that law
protecting public interests is frequently circumvented by transnational corporations and
Karsten Nowrot’s suggestion that transnational corporations be more deeply integrated
within the international legal process); Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking
Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 411, 412 (2005) (discussing the myriad of ways in which corporations engage in and
exercise influence on governance); Issachar Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can
Corporate Social Responsibility Do for Climate Change?, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 527,
531–32 (2001). See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess & Jens Mertens, Transnational Corporations, Global Competition Policy, and the Shortcomings of Private International Law,
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2011).
72
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 69, at 45–49 (citing BP, General Electric, and IBM as
examples of multinational enterprises that “have moved towards a more flexible and innovation driven structure”); see also CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT: TEXT CASES AND READINGS IN CROSS-BORDER MANAGEMENT 774–813,
(McGraw Hill Irwin Press, 4th ed. 2004).
73
See generally ZERK, supra note 43.
74
See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 399–400 (2005).
75
See generally ZERK, supra note 43 (identifying and analyzing several different regulatory approaches to multinational corporations).
76
See Emesh et al., supra note 7, at 236–37 (defining CSR as an attempt “to expand the
scope of corporate obligations beyond the traditional duty of care to their shareholders recognized by the law but also to their workers and the community in which they operate”).
77
YUNUS, supra note 2, at 9.
78
Steven Munch, Note, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
170, 178 (2012).
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to government regulation by encouraging more socially and environmentally responsible approaches to corporate governance.79 Critics counter that
CSR’s voluntary transparency is simply an attempt to preempt government
regulation and protect a corporation’s brand image.80 This Part identifies several examples of CSR, including corporate responsibility reporting (CR reporting), corporate codes of conduct, and constituency statutes.81 Part I.A concludes that MNCs remain largely unaccountable for their negative social or
environmental outputs despite CSR’s various manifestations.82
Next, Part I.B turns to existing regulation of MNCs.83 This Part concludes that the combination of jurisdictional hurdles and weak regulatory
tools results in a general inability to effectively regulate MNCs, and finds
both CSR and existing regulatory tools insufficient for addressing corporate
responsibility.84 While the kneejerk reaction for more regulation has been
advanced by some commentators,85 this Article suggests that the hallmark
of the social enterprise movement—the blended corporate purpose—has the
potential to change the legal landscape of corporate responsibility.
A. Corporate Responsibility
1. Corporate Responsibility Reporting
Corporate responsibility (CR) reporting is the increasingly widespread
practice amongst MNCs of voluntarily reporting their environmental, social,
and economic impacts.86 Indeed, nearly all of the world’s largest corporations
79

See Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate
Codes in the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603, 604
(2011); Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537.
80
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 539.
81
The author acknowledges that socially and environmentally responsible shareholder
proposals have also been another method pursued by CSR. See Ian B. Lee, Corporate
Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.,
Spring 2005, at 31, 71–72 (discussing the sources of authority for socially responsible investing and supporting the existing availability of shareholder proxies for socially responsible shareholder proposals). However, such shareholder proposals often obtain less than
30% of the votes and are generally voted down. See 2010 US-SIF Report, supra note 10, at
50 fig.4.6 (showing that in 2010, only 29% of social and environmental shareholder proposals received greater than 30% support). For examples of such proposals related to
climate change, see Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate
Disclosure: Are Things Heating Up in the Boardroom?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 322 (2008).
82
See infra Part I.A.4.
83
See infra Part I.B.
84
See infra Part I.C.
85
See Emesh et al., supra note 7, at 253–54.
86
Adam Sulkowski & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Measures and
the Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Implications for Business and
Legal Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491, 492 (2010).
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now issue CR reports. KPMG’s latest triennial survey of CR reporting shows
that, as of 2011, 95% of the Global Fortune 250 (G250) companies engage in
some form of CR reporting, up from 81% in 2008.87 The 2011 KPMG survey
also reported that the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards are used by
80% of G250 companies engaged in CR reporting.88
At first glance, these statistics seem to suggest that CR reporting has
been a great success. Indeed, to the extent CSR aims to require CR reports,
it has succeeded. However, critics emphasize that despite its near-universal
practice, CR reporting remains voluntary and without any binding legal obligations.89 Moreover, CR reports are unaudited and fail to require any standardized methodology,90 calling into question the accuracy of self-reported
data.91 Critics contend that the malleable nature of CR reporting favors corporations, who are free to skew or omit data regarding negative social or environmental outputs.92
In addition, recent data suggests that executives increasingly view CR reporting as a public relations tool rather than a vehicle for increased transparency or consideration of stakeholder interests.93 KPMG’s 2011 survey includes polling results from executives of G250 corporations regarding the
perceived drivers underlying CR reporting.94 KPMG’s 2008 survey indicated
that executives’ prime motivators were ethical and economic considerations.95 However, in the wake of the recession, the leading motivator behind
CR reporting shifted to concern for the corporation’s reputation and brand
image.96 This rise of brand image as the single greatest driver of CR reporting
87

KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2011, at
6–7 (2011), http://www.kpmg.com/PT/pt/IssuesAndInsights/Documents/corporate-respons
ibility2011.pdf [hereinafter 2011 KPMG SURVEY]; see also Sulkowski & White, supra note
86, at 494 (identifying and analyzing data from KPMG’s 2008 International Survey).
88
2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 20–21; see also Sulkowski & White, supra
note 86, at 494.
89
See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 531–34. See generally ZERK, supra note 43.
90
See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–44; Jackson, supra note 9, at 389–90.
91
See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–44; Jackson, supra note 9, at 389–90.
92
See 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 26 (“Unlike financial reporting, the
disclosure of sustainability metrics to the market is largely unregulated.”); Jackson, supra
note 9, at 389.
93
See 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 18–19.
94
Id. at 19.
95
KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008,
at 18 (2008), available at http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublica
tions/pages/sustainability-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2008.aspx; see also Sulkowski
& White, supra note 86, at 496–98, 498 n.41.
96
2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 18–19 (reporting that the number one motivator behind CR reporting was “reputation/brand” with 67%; “ethical considerations” trailed
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today raises the specter of “greenwashing” and appears to justify the healthy
skepticism regarding the accuracy and comprehensiveness of these reports.97
Furthermore, critics emphasize that CR reporting fails to involve board
members in the process. Indeed, a majority of G250 directors have no direct
involvement with CR reports, resulting in a failure to embed CSR’s social
and environmental goals in the highest levels of the corporate decisionmaking process.98 Additionally, CR reports are seldom issued in conjunction
with, or included in, a corporation’s annual financial report.99 This practice
reflects a purposeful attempt to avoid government oversight of CR reports,
as explained by consultants at KPMG:
The current practice of a separate CSR report (regardless of the medium
used) from the annual report leaves freedom in reporting in terms of the
associated legal risks. An annual report comes with specific reporting requirements, external oversight and legal accountability towards parties
with a financial interest in the company. Therefore, if integrated reporting
is approached as integrating CSR information (and other business-impacting information) into the annual report, additional legal risks can appear that you would rather avoid.100

Moreover, critics argue that CR reporting does not ensure any standardized methodology, which leads to inaccurate results. In conducting an empirical study on thirty MNC’s CR reports to assess their effectiveness regarding
efforts to combat climate change, Issachar Rosen-Zvi highlights how variances
in methodology allow major energy companies to effectively hide significant
greenhouse gas emissions,101 and permit major automobile manufacturers to
choose the most favorable baseline years from which their greenhouse gas
emissions are measured.102 Additionally, many CR reporting standards against
significantly behind at number two with 58%, and “economic considerations” dropped off
significantly to just 32%).
97
See ZERK, supra note 43, at 100–01 (“Some multinationals have seen their environmental initiatives dismissed as ‘greenwash’, while others have been accused of using CSRrelated initiatives as a way of diverting attention away from bad press elsewhere or as a tactical
concession to avoid more stringent legislation at some later stage.” (footnotes omitted)).
98
2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 27 (“[N]early half of the reporting companies
either do not disclose—or possibly do not have—board member responsibility or involvement,
which would be a key condition to embedding CR reporting into an organization.”).
99
KPMG, INTEGRATED REPORTING: CLOSING THE LOOP OF STRATEGY 3 (April 2010)
[hereinafter INTEGRATED REPORTING], http://www.kpmg.com/GR/en/IssuesAndInsights
/ArticlesPublications/Sustainability/Documents/Sustainable-insight-April-2010.pdf; see also
2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 23 (indicating that only 27% of the G250 corporations include some form of CR reporting in their annual report).
100
INTEGRATED REPORTING, supra note 99, at 8.
101
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 543–48.
102
Id. at 548–52.
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which MNCs measure their practices, such as the GRI Guidelines, the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards, the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 International Environmental
Standards, and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies
(CERES) Principles, fail to provide any mathematical formula or valuation
metric for a corporation’s social and environmental benefits.103
In sum, CR reporting is increasingly recognized for what it is—a public
relations tool that pays lip service to increased corporate transparency but
does little, if anything, to alter the corporate decision-making process.104
2. Corporate Codes of Conduct
Modern corporate codes of conduct are not a recent development and
are now common in many jurisdictions.105 In theory, codes serve to “enhance corporations’ social and environmental commitments by articulating
the norms and standards by which they profess to be bound.”106 Like CR
reporting, most corporate codes of conduct are voluntary.107 However, the
current voluntary promulgation and adherence to codes of conduct belies
the original intent of modern codes.108 Indeed, codes promulgated in the
1970s had a distinctly international flavor and were originally devised as
third party regulatory tools for international organizations (IOs).109 To that
end, IOs like the United Nations (UN),110 the Organization for Economic
103

But see Allison M. Snyder, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is NonFinancial Disclosure the Answer?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 565, 593 (2007) (noting that,
in contrast to GRI and other popular CR reporting standards, the CSI Social Footprint does
provide mathematical valuation for a corporation’s social and environmental benefits).
104
Snyder, supra note 103, at 605 (“Empirical evidence illustrates that corporations do, in
fact, use reports as a form of public relations and often fail to take social concerns seriously.”).
105
See generally Index of Codes, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., http://www.ecgi.org
/codes/all_codes.php (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing links to corporate codes of
conduct in over 80 jurisdictions).
106
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537; see also Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New
Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct, 14 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 1, 3–4 (2005) (arguing
that companies may also develop codes for the purpose of influencing other societal actors).
107
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 537.
108
For a more thorough historical analysis of corporate codes of conduct, see Mark B.
Baker, Promises and Platitudes: Toward a New 21st Century Paradigm for Corporate
Codes of Conduct?, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 123, 125–29 (2007).
109
See id. at 126–27, 129.
110
The UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was charged with
drafting a code of conduct for transnational corporations in 1976. Background and Activities of the Commission and the Centre on Transnational Corporations, UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTC%20from%201976
%20to%201979.aspx (last updated June 13, 2003).
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Co-operation and Development (OECD),111 and the International Labor Organization (ILO)112 promulgated mandatory codes of conduct for multinationals. Efforts at enforcement, however, proved largely unsuccessful. Professor José Alvarez argues that the Reagan Administration, concerned over
the potential impact of the “The New Regulatory Order”113 on U.S. corporations, joined with business interests to defeat efforts to promulgate enforceable codes of conduct, or to shift negotiations to more favorable fora.114
This approach proved successful. The UNCTC’s efforts were abandoned in
1993 after fourteen years of unsuccessful negotiations.115 Both the OECD’s
Declaration and the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration survive, but they remain
voluntary and “toothless”116 soft law.117 At most, these declarations are
“part of an important inter-organizational dialogue concerning the legal responsibilities of multinational corporations[,]”118 but they fail to effect any
111

The governments of OECD Member Countries adopted the Declaration on International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises on June 21, 1976. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
15–22 (1984). As of May 2011, all thirty-four OECD Members, Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and seven other non-OECD countries have adopted the Declaration. OECD Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD (May 25, 2011), http://
www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/oecddeclarationoninternation
alinvestmentandmultinationalenterprises.htm.
112
INT’L LABOR ORG., TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY (Nov. 16, 1977), reprinted in 17
I.L.M. 422, 423 (1978).
113
JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 255 (Oxford
Univ. Press, 2005) (citing Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Foreword to INTERNATIONAL REGULATION:
NEW RULES IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER (Carol C. Adelman ed., 1988)).
114
Id.
115
See UNCTC Evolution, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://
unctc.unctad.org/aspx/UNCTCEvolution.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (describing the
1993 dissolution of the UNCTC and the transfer to the UNCTAD). In 2003, the UN
promulgated the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12
/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/normsAug2003.html [hereinafter UN Norms]. Like its predecessor, the UN Norms were abandoned and replaced with the voluntary Global Compact Project. See Overview of the UN
Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org
/AboutTheGC/ (last updated Dec. 1, 2011); John H. Knox, The Human Rights Council
Endorses “Guiding Principles” for Corporations, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110801.pdf.
116
ALVAREZ, supra note 113, at 256.
117
Id. at 230 (noting that the ILO’s decision to promulgate these principles as a Declaration
“suggests the intent to render this a truly ‘soft’ form of soft law [and] presumably reflects ...
emphasis on affecting the conduct of private entities within states”).
118
Id.
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substantive changes in and of themselves. At the international level, chances
of establishing enforceable codes of conduct on MNCs appear very low.
At the domestic level, some legislators attempted to pick up this torch
by proposing legislation that would require MNCs to adopt corporate
codes of conduct. However, these bills all died silent deaths in committee.
In the United States, former Rep. Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), along with
thirty-two cosponsors, introduced the Corporate Code of Conduct Act
(CCCA) in June of 2000.119 The CCCA would require any U.S. corporation employing “more than 20 persons in a foreign country, either directly
or through subsidiaries[,] ... [to] take the necessary steps to implement [a]
Corporate Code of Conduct.”120 The CCCA was tabled,121 reintroduced on
May 11, 2006 as H.R. 5377,122 and was tabled again by the House Financial Services Committee.123 Comparable legislation introduced in Australia124 and the European Parliament125 suffered similar fates.
For the moment, it appears that business interests have succeeded in
stifling both international and domestic attempts to mandate enforceable
corporate codes of conduct. The consistent failures to legislate in this area
underscore the lack of political will necessary to pass codes with effective
government enforcement and regulatory mechanisms on MNCs.
As a result, corporate codes of conduct have become increasingly individualistic,126 vesting MNCs with broad discretion in drafting and enforcement. MNCs are free to choose whether to author codes independently or
with stakeholder representatives, and whether to adopt unilateral codes,
codes promulgated by industry groups, or model codes promulgated by
international organizations or trade unions.127 Mark Baker argues that these
options offer the benefit of flexibility, but that the resulting codes are flawed
insofar as they: (i) fail to contain any specific content requirement;128 (ii) do
119

Baker, supra note 108, at 155–56.
Id. at 156–57.
121
Id. at 156.
122
H.R. 5377, 109th Cong. (2006).
123
See H.R. 5377 (109th): Corporate Code of Conduct Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr5377 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). No further action
has been taken by Congress.
124
ZERK, supra note 43, at 165–66 (noting that the Australian Code of Conduct Bill
was not recommended by the Statutory Committee).
125
Id. at 170 (noting that the European Parliament’s Resolution on a Voluntary Code
of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries was never formally implemented).
126
See Baker, supra note 108, at 129.
127
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 538.
128
Baker, supra note 108, at 131.
120
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not ensure they will be taken seriously by either managers or employees;129
(iii) “do not contain adequate monitoring and enforcement procedures to ensure compliance[;]”130 and (iv) are largely confined to corporations dealing in
consumer goods.131 Moreover, due to the lack of content requirements and
standardized methodologies for measuring social and environmental performance, observers have found it increasingly difficult to compare and contrast
one MNC’s social or environmental benefits with those of another.132
Even where codes of conduct and internal monitoring mechanisms are in
place, there is no guarantee they will effect any substantive changes in business
operations.133 Consider Nike, for example.134 Allison M. Snyder points to a
recent study of 800 Nike factories in fifty-one different countries that assessed
the effectiveness of codes of conduct in improving working conditions.135 The
study concluded that despite Nike’s efforts, internal monitoring for code compliance alone did not improve its suppliers’ working conditions.136
In sum, while the adoption of codes of conduct should be commended
insofar as they acknowledge the negative social and environmental externalities produced by MNCs, it appears these codes maintain the involuntary,
malleable, and legally unenforceable qualities of the aforementioned CR
reports. As several commentators conclude, “the grim fact remains that
[MNCs] owe no legal obligations to anyone when they fail to abide with
particular provisions of such Codes, or choose to extricate themselves totally from its provisions.”137
129

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133; see also 2011 KPMG SURVEY, supra note 87, at 26 (“Unlike financial
reporting, the disclosure of sustainability metrics to the market is largely unregulated.”);
ZERK, supra note 43, at 164 (noting that there is no effective way of ensuring compliance
with voluntary codes of conduct).
131
Baker, supra note 108, at 134.
132
See Rosen-Zvi, supra note 71, at 538–39 (opting to rely on hard numbers provided
by corporations regarding their environmental emissions, rather than “the softer public
relations statements they make” in their CSRs).
133
See Richard M. Locke et al., Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards?: Lessons
from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 8–9, 20–21 (2007).
134
Id.
135
Snyder, supra note 103, at 595–96 (citing Locke et al., supra 133, at 20).
136
Locke et al., supra note 133, at 20–21; cf. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 499, 518 (2008) [hereinafter Backer, Multinational Corporations] (describing
how Gap, Inc.’s 2005 Code of Vendor Conduct permitted Gap to “effectively assess civil
penalties, impose training or other rehabilitation programs, compel changes in internal
organization or terminate the contractual relationship with the enterprises subject to its
standards”).
137
Emeseh et al., supra note 7, at 258; see also ZERK, supra note 43, at 161 (discussing
the fact that codes of conduct generally do not provide for the imposition of legal sanctions).
130
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3. Constituency Statutes
Yet another example of CSR’s efforts to enhance transparency and promote consideration of stakeholder interests is the constituency statute.138 Several commentators characterize constituency statutes as legislative responses
to the frenzy of hostile corporate takeovers of the 1980s.139 In 1983, Pennsylvania became the first of about thirty states to enact constituency statutes.140
In general, “[t]hese statutes explicitly permit directors to consider the effects
of their decisions on a variety of nonshareholder interests[,]”141 including the
long- and short-term effects of their decisions on constituency groups such as
suppliers, employees, creditors, local communities, and customers.142 While
most lawmakers likely had change-of-control decisions in mind when enacting constituency statutes, CSR proponents observe that the application of
constituency statutes is not necessarily limited to situations in which the
corporation is for sale,143 and argue that such statutes attract socially responsible businesses, which, in turn, foster innovation and competition.144
Thus, on paper, constituency statutes are applicable to any business decision, and have potentially far-reaching effects on corporate governance and
decision-making.
However, in all but three states, constituency statutes are written in permissive language.145 Critics emphasize that most constituency statutes permit
directors to consider stakeholder interests, but “do not force a corporation to
conduct itself in a socially responsible manner.”146 Permissive constituency
138

Gary von Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 479–81 (1994).
139
See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 973 (“In the wake of the 1980s’ merger mania, the
corporate social responsibility debate resurfaced [as constituency statutes].”); Anthony Bisconti,
Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially Responsible
Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 780–81 (2009); Gary von
Stange, supra note 138, at 467–69 (portraying constituency statutes as a reaction to “the
feeding frenzy atmosphere of numerous hostile takeovers” in the 1980s).
140
Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 479. As of 2012, thirty-three states have enacted
some form of constituency statute. See Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 830, 830 n.64.
141
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 973; see also Kerr, supra note 20, at 634.
142
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 986.
143
See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 986; Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 829 (“With
the increase of mission-driven and triple-bottom-line corporations, these constituency
statutes are now being analyzed outside the context of a hostile takeover.”); Eric W. Orts,
Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 14, 30–31 (1992).
144
Bisconti, supra note 139, at 786.
145
Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 480–81 (noting that only Arizona, Idaho, and
Connecticut have enacted constituency statutes that are mandatory).
146
Id. at 483; see also Fei, supra note 24, at 41.
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statutes also fail to require transparency on social and environmental performance.147 Professor Bainbridge concludes that constituency statutes “are
frustratingly silent on many key issues,”148 lack any substantive or procedural standards, and offer “surprisingly little guidance”149 to both board
members and courts. Other critics observe the dearth of case law interpreting constituency statutes150 and conclude that the statutes “function only to
the extent that they do not conflict with shareholder primacy.”151
From the perspective of judicial review, constituency statutes appear to
hold some promise in the context of day-to-day decisions or defensive decisions, where courts will generally apply the business judgment rule and
give deference to the board’s decision.152 However, the impotence of constituency statutes is most evident in the context of a change-of-control decision, which triggers the so-called Revlon153 duty to maximize shareholder wealth.154 The Revlon rule of shareholder primacy dealt a significant
blow to proponents of constituency statutes insofar as it essentially nullified constituency statutes with respect to the most crucial of all business
decisions—the sale of the corporation.155 Moreover, subsequent case law
regarding constituency statutes appears to follow the Delaware Supreme
Court’s approach. For example, in Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier156 a
Pennsylvania district court applied the Revlon duty in the context of a singleparty takeover attempt.157
147

Fei, supra note 24, at 41.
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 988.
149
Id. at 974.
150
Bisconti, supra note 139, at 784.
151
Id.
152
For a more thorough analysis of the three different levels of scrutiny courts will apply
in evaluating business decisions, see Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 834–36; Felicia R.
Resor, Comment, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 96–97 (2012).
153
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
154
The Revlon case involved a change-of-control situation wherein competing parties
engaged in several rounds of bidding. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177–79; see also Bainbridge, supra
note 20, at 982. The Delaware Supreme Court held that once the directors decided to sell the
company, their sole responsibility was to maximize shareholder value, or, in the words of the
court, to become “auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders,” thus
precluding any consideration of stakeholder interests. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
155
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 982–84 (noting that Revlon “sharply limits” consideration
by directors of stakeholder interests, and “puts considerable teeth into the” shareholder-centric
theory of corporate governance); see also Bisconti, supra note 139, at 784, 786–88 (observing
that “[c]onstituency statutes are essentially rendered impotent in [the Revlon] scenario”).
156
Baron, 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
157
See id. at 697 (attributing to corporate directors in Pennsylvania a duty to act in the
best interests of shareholders); Bisconti, supra note 139, at 788–89 (arguing that the court
148
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Some critics have gone so far as to suggest that constituency statutes are
harmful in an “unscrupulous director” scenario.158 In authorizing directors to
consider stakeholder interests, Professor Bainbridge argues that they also
serve as a shield for unscrupulous directors to consider their own interests.159
As Gary von Stange notes, this risks vesting “more unbridled power in the
hands of management.”160
4. Conclusion
As this review has shown, CSR’s attempts to increase transparency and
integrate consideration of stakeholder interests into corporate decision-making
have not succeeded. CR reporting, corporate codes of conduct, and constituency statutes have largely failed to affect any observable changes in business as usual.161 The unaudited, unenforceable, and voluntary nature of CR
reports and corporate codes of conduct render them ineffective approaches
to enhancing corporations’ social and environmental commitments. Permissive constituency statutes have likewise failed to bring about any significant
change. While they grant directors broad discretion to consider stakeholder
interests in day-to-day decisions and defensive decisions, their voluntary
language leaves stakeholders to “rely upon the goodwill of the board.”162
Moreover, in light of the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder value, constituency statutes have been rendered meaningless in the context of changeof-control decisions and do not cover the recurring public benefit actions
social entrepreneurs seek to engage in.163 With the shortcomings of CSR in
mind, this Article next turns to existing tools for regulating MNCs.
B. Regulation of Multinational Corporations
“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
focused on protecting or benefiting shareholders to avoid determining how much weight
should be given to constituency statutes).
158
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1025; see also Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at
488–89 (arguing that corporate managers may actually have encouraged adoption of constituency statutes to protect their own interests by enlarging their discretionary powers).
159
Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1025.
160
Gary von Stange, supra note 138, at 489.
161
Page & Katz, New Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 49, at 1360–61 (“But
despite decades of commentary and scholarship, the legal debate has failed to advance CSR in
any significant way ... although CSR may have good ideas about corporate behavior, it has
generally failed to produce meaningful large-scale legal reform.” (footnotes omitted)).
162
Jackson, supra note 9, at 347.
163
Munch, supra note 78, at 178–79.
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territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”164 As a result, unless Congress
explicitly intends otherwise, courts will presume a statute is “primarily concerned with domestic conditions.”165 This traditional presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic law rests on the assumption that the subjects and objects of regulation share common jurisdictional identities.166
However, the simultaneous spread of globalization and investment treaties
has undermined this assumption with respect to MNCs.167
As a result, MNCs are able to avoid effective regulation in developed
states by moving operations to developing states where their power and influence effectively “substitute themselves as new regulators of behavior.”168
Thus, while domestic statutes provide an avenue for domestic regulation,169
there is no corollary on the international level. As Jennifer Zerk explains, obtaining territorial jurisdiction over MNCs’ negative social and environmental
externalities presents a significant obstacle for potential plaintiffs.170 With
this jurisdictional hurdle as a backdrop, this Part turns to two main aspects
of the legal landscape with respect to regulation of MNCs—namely, disclosure requirements and private enforcement.
1. Disclosure Requirements
In the United States, all publicly-traded companies are subject to the
Securities Exchange Commission’s (SEC) disclosure requirements.171 SEC
regulation S-K provides the framework for annual and quarterly disclosure
164

EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949), as cited in Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869, 2877 (2010)).
165
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248).
166
See Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order,
18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 754 (2011) [hereinafter Backer, Private Actors].
167
See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 136, at 504; Backer, Private Actors, supra note 166, at 754 (discussing the effects of globalization).
168
Backer, Private Actors, supra note 166, at 754; see also Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 136, at 503–04 (explaining that while states’ regulatory powers often
“extend no further than their political borders,” mutlinationals “tend to operate across
political borders – to move assets, operations and activities in ways in which political borders become incidental to their activities”).
169
See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 136, at 503 (noting that while the
interaction of traditional frameworks has been effective in regulating domestic entities, “it has
proven to be less useful in the management of multinational corporations and similar entities”).
170
See generally ZERK, supra note 43, at 104–42 (discussing the problem of jurisdiction as it
relates to regulation of the social and environmental activities of multinational corporations).
171
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78q (2006).
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requirements contained in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.172 These reporting requirements were recently revised
pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.173 However, none of these
statutes requires that a corporation report its negative social outputs, and the
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments do not impose additional requirements with
respect to a corporation’s environmental impacts.
Environmental concerns are, however, relevant to Regulation S-K,
Items 101,174 103,175 303,176 and 503.177 Item 101 requires disclosure of
costs of complying with environmental law.178 Item 103 requires disclosure
of any “administrative or judicial proceeding ... arising under any Federal,
State or local” environmental law.179 Item 303 requires disclosure of known
trends, events, commitments, and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to
have a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or results of
operation.180 Lastly, Item 503 requires a discussion of the most significant
factors, such as environmental factors, that make an investment in the company speculative or risky.181 Despite the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley did not
impose increased environmental reporting,182 some commentators note that
the SEC’s interpretations of the existing regulations suggest the agency is
applying greater scrutiny on certifying and quantifying such environmental liabilities.183
172

See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2011).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 401–409, 116 Stat. 745,
785–791 (2002) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
174
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii).
175
17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
176
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (requiring the disclosure of rare events that materially
affect the company).
177
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (requiring disclosure of risk factors); HERBERT S. WANDER,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES: SECURITIES LAW DISCLOSURE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY AND DODD-FRANK 493,
670–71, 883–84 (2011) (explaining that Item 503 requires disclosure of risk factors and how
Items 101, 103, and 303 apply to environmental disclosures).
178
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2010).
179
17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
180
17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
181
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (specifying that risk factor disclosure should clearly identify the
risk and articulate how that risk affects the company).
182
See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 8 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243371.pdf (concluding that “[w]hile [SarbanesOxley] does not contain provisions that specifically address environmental disclosure, some
of them could lead to improved reporting of environmental liabilities”) (emphasis added)).
183
WANDER, supra note 177, at 889–90.
173
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Consider, for example, the SEC’s February 8, 2010 interpretive release on
climate change.184 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro emphasized that it neither
created any new legal requirements nor modified existing requirements, but
that it instead was “intended to provide clarity and enhance consistency”185
regarding climate change-related disclosures. To that end, the release identified four main areas in which climate change may prompt disclosure requirements, to wit: (1) impact of legislation and regulation;186 (2) impact of
international accords;187 (3) indirect consequences of regulation or business
trends;188 and (4) physical impact of climate change.189
Practically speaking, disclosure under Item 303—“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, or
MD&A”190—is potentially the most fruitful avenue by which a corporation
might disclose its environmental impacts in relation to climate change. However, the SEC’s climate change release does not change the framework for
preparing MD&A disclosure, and simply reiterates the traditional MD&A
analysis that turns entirely on management’s conclusions regarding the “material effect” of environmental impacts on the company’s financial condition.191
The “materiality” standard has been criticized by some scholars for its
failure to fully account for a corporation’s total environmental impacts.192
Jennifer Zerk explains: “apart from information that is necessary to assess
the financial position and prospects of the corporate group, these [environmental and social] disclosures are still largely voluntary.”193 In addition to
184

Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg.
6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Climate Change Release].
185
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Open
Commission Meeting on Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the
Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/sp
ch012710mls-climate.htm; see also Subcommittee on Annual Review, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, ABA Section of Business Law, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation: Section I: Regulatory Developments 2010, 66 BUS. LAW 665, 749–54 (2011);
Wander, supra note 177, at 892–93.
186
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9106, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6925, 6295–96 (Feb. 8, 2010).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 6295–97.
190
Id. at 6294–95.
191
See id. at 6295; see also Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations: Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429 (May 24, 1989).
192
Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumulative Materiality” in Corporate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 497,
500 (2005).
193
ZERK, supra note 43, at 175.

666

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:639

the voluntary nature of environmental disclosure, other commentators argue
that federal securities law has been unsuccessful in promoting corporate environmental protection in general.194 Mitchell Crusto has described the SEC’s
materiality standard as “elusive”195 and suggests adopting the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) Cumulative Materiality Standards of
Corporate Environmental Disclosure to broaden the scope of materiality to
include total environmental impacts, not simply those that are material to a
corporation’s financial condition.196 Alternatively, drawing upon recent
shareholder proposals, Perry Wallace suggests the introduction of a fiduciary duty to investigate and monitor greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.197 At
present, however, it appears that the SEC will stay the course and continue
to require the traditional materiality standard, ensuring that corporations
traded publicly in the United States remain free to omit, or selectively disclose, “non-material” environmental impacts.
2. Private Enforcement
Many states do not grant to non-residents any rights to enforce domestic
environmental or health and safety regulations.198 This does not mean, however, that foreign plaintiffs are left without a forum to pursue an enforcement action against MNCs. This Section identifies three vehicles through
which individuals may assert claims against MNCs: trade practice actions,
OECD actions, and the Alien Tort Statute.199
a. Trade Practice Actions
Private individuals opposing the actions of MNCs may file a complaint
under domestic trade practice legislation.200 However, these actions only
address a MNC’s “statements and representations”201 regarding its trade
practices. Accordingly, trade practice actions provide a remedy for indirectly holding MNCs accountable for alleged trade practice violations.202
194

Crusto, supra note 192, at 500.
Id. at 497.
196
Id. at 500–09.
197
Wallace, supra note 81, at 322 (citing Interfaith Ctr. on Corp. Responsibility, Proposed Shareholder Resolution on Embedded Climate Risk, available at http://www.iccr.org
/shareholder/proxy_book03/environment/climaterisk_oxy.htm (accessed by entering URL
in the Internet Archive index)).
198
ZERK, supra note 43, at 182–83.
199
See id. at 183–85.
200
Id. at 185.
201
Id.
202
Id.
195
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Despite the indirect nature of these actions, some proponents point to
the Nike, Inc. v. Kasky203 litigation in the United States as evidence of the
“potential to cause a great deal of embarrassment for companies.”204 In that
case, sweatshop activist Marc Kasky brought suit against Nike in California,
alleging that Nike had misled the public regarding the company’s foreign
suppliers’ workplace standards, in violation of the California Business and
Professions Code.205 Nike prevailed in the California Court of Appeals but
lost in the California Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal.206 Three months after the Supreme Court’s decision, the parties reached a settlement207 in which Nike agreed to pay $1.5
million to the Fair Labor Association without admitting any wrongdoing.208
The apparent success of the Kasky v. Nike litigation belies the fact that
Nike continues to purchase materials from foreign clothing suppliers with
substandard workplace conditions.209 Furthermore, California stands alone
as the only state to offer the particular “private attorney general action”210
used by Kasky.211 As this suggests, the effectiveness of this unique right of
action depends largely on “shaming” MNCs through media spotlight and
public outrage. Moreover, as the settlement terms and subsequent practice
suggest, even where trade practice actions are successful, they fail to persuade MNCs to modify their business practices.
b. OECD Actions
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
is an international organization comprised of thirty-four member states focused
203

539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam); see SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 101–11 (Colin Harvey ed., 2004) (providing an overview of
the case and its impact on both corporations and consumer rights litigation).
204
ZERK, supra note 43, at 185.
205
See Nike, 539 U.S. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring); ZERK, supra note 43, at 185. See
generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17200–17209 (West 2012) (providing the governing provisions of the California Business and Professions Code).
206
JOSEPH, supra note 203, at 102. The case was ultimately dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds. See Nike, 539 U.S. at 657–58 (Stephens, J., concurring) (articulating the reasons
that supported the decision to dismiss the grant of certiorari, including failure by the California
Supreme Court to properly enter final judgment and a lack of standing by either party).
207
JOSEPH, supra note 203, at 102, 104–05.
208
Id. at 104–05.
209
See Locke et al., supra note 133, at 20–21 (discussing how Nike’s new monitoring
systems failed to produce an improvement in working conditions within Nike’s suppliers);
Snyder, supra note 103, at 595–96 (discussing the same).
210
ZERK, supra note 43, at 185; see also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17203, 17206.
211
ZERK, supra note 43, at 185. The Australian Trade Practices Act of 1974, however,
permits “any person” to apply “to have legislative prohibitions on misleading or deceptive
conduct enforced” regardless of whether the person is a resident of Australia and without a
showing of personal harm by the defendant’s conduct. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on “promot[ing] policies that will improve the economic and social wellbeing of people around the world.”212 In 1976, pursuant to this mission, the
OECD proposed Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines).213 The OECD Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Council as part
of the broader Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.214 The OECD Guidelines are occasionally updated, most recently
on May 25, 2011 in conjunction with the OECD’s fiftieth anniversary.215 A
total of forty-four governments, representing 85% of the world’s foreign direct investment, have agreed to adhere by the OECD Guidelines and encourage their enterprises to observe them wherever they operate.216
Private individuals may raise issues concerning compliance with the
OECD Guidelines with the correct National Contact Point (NCP).217 Notably, the 2000 Revision to the OECD Guidelines extends its scope to nonadhering countries, theoretically easing the burden of territorial jurisdiction
over MNCs.218 Once a compliance issue has been raised, the NCP is obligated to “contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances.”219 In resolving these
issues, the NCP is authorized to make an initial assessment of whether the
issues merit further examination and to offer aid to parties involved in resolving the issues.220 If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the NCP is
required to issue a statement containing appropriate “recommendations on
the implementation of the Guidelines.”221
OECD actions may overcome the hurdle of territorial jurisdiction and bring
the parties to the table. However, these actions lack any enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance.222 Furthermore, the NCP’s mediation procedures
212

About the OECD: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_
1,00.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
213
See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Update, OECD, http://www
.oecd.org/document/28/0,3746,en_2649_34889_2397532_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2013).
214
OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 13 (2011), http://www.
oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/48004323.pdf.
215
Id. at 3.
216
About the OECD, supra note 212.
217
OECD, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Revision 2000, at 31–33,
35–37 (June 2000), http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20Activity/Resources
/OECDGuidelines15419.pdf; ZERK, supra note 43, at 184.
218
See id. at 31.
219
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, supra note 213, at 72.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 73.
222
ZERK, supra note 43, at 184 (also noting that the Guidelines are non-binding).

2013]

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE REVOLUTION

669

are confidential, and recommendations are only revealed to the public if the
NCP determines confidentiality would be contrary to effective implementation of the OECD Guidelines.223
c. Alien Tort Statute
In recent decades, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)224 has been at the forefront of litigation against MNCs in the United States. The ATS provides
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”225 The decades following the landmark case of
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala226 witnessed some success in using the ATS to hold
MNCs responsible for their participation in human rights abuses.227 Similar
actions against MNCs for their participation in environmental abuses, however, were not as successful due to the reluctance on the part of federal
courts to find that principles of international environmental law have crystallized into customary international law as contemplated by Filartiga.228
Moreover, the window of corporate liability under the ATS may be
quickly closing. On February 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell.229 The main issue in Kiobel is
whether corporations may be held liable for violations of the law of nations,
such as torture, extrajudicial killings, or genocide.230 Surprisingly, less than
one week later, on March 5, 2012, the Supreme Court ordered the case “restored to the calendar for reargument” and directed the parties to file briefs on
223

Id. at 184–85.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
225
Id.
226
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
227
See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
318–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Historically, states, and to a lesser extent individuals, have been
held liable under international law. However, ... substantial international and United States
precedent indicates that corporations may also be held liable under international law, at least
for gross human rights violations.”).
228
See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that plaintiff and amici submissions “refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility
and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable [sic] standards and
regulations to identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts”);
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 414 F.3d 233, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2003) (articulating and applying
the sources of international law).
229
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (Oct. 17, 2011); Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kio
bel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/?wpmp_switcher=desktop (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
230
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 115–17.
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the issue of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute,
28 U.S.C. §1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”231 The expansion of the issue from general corporate liability
under the ATS to the existence of a cause of action under the ATS does not
bode well for the statute’s proponents, as it may signal that the Court is inclined to interpret the ATS as a jurisdictional statute not giving rise to any
special cause of action. Such a result would effectively remove one of the
sharpest arrows from the quivers of potential foreign plaintiffs seeking to hold
MNCs accountable in U.S. courts.
C. Conclusion
This Part has explained the shortcomings and flaws of CSR and the current regulatory regime with respect to MNCs. The various iterations of
CSR, including CR reporting, codes of conduct, and constituency statutes,
are voluntary, passive, and unenforceable mechanisms to regulate corporate
behavior. Any attempt to expand private rights of action against MNCs has
been consistently met with swift political opposition. Extraterritorial regulation of MNCs remains elusive at the international level, and prospects for
changing this status quo are slim.
The reality is that the world’s largest corporations operate in a supranational arena where traditional jurisdictional boundaries are increasingly irrelevant. Moreover, as the history of CSR and attempted global regulatory
schemes makes clear, there is no “silver bullet” solution to this problem. Larry Catá Backer opines that the failure of CSR “might indicate that political
institutions might not be the appropriate vehicle for the elaboration of regulatory systems based on such substantive notions .... Rather it might suggest the possibility of substantive regulation devolving to non–political
actors.”232 Backer makes a valuable point, which invites the question of
how to incentivize “non–political actors” (for example, corporations) to
enforce substantive regulations.
One can come much closer to a viable solution to this problem once one
accepts the limitations of regulation and entertains the idea of fundamentally altering the very nature and purpose of the corporate entity itself. After
decades of unsuccessful attempts to regulate MNCs, the pendulum of corporate law has begun to swing away from government regulation and towards
231

Order in Pending Case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2012)
(Order No. 10-1491) (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/030512zr.pdf.
232
Backer, Moral Obligation, supra note 43, at 620.
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the creation of innovative corporate forms that weave social and environmental responsibility into the fabric of these entities. By constantly pursuing
blended values, social enterprise forces all interested parties, including investors, shareholders, directors, courts, counsel, and stakeholders, to confront
and resolve competing interests with the overarching goal of achieving measurable social and environmental benefits. The growing demand for innovation in this arena has led to the rapid enactment of social enterprise entities
in both Europe and the United States. This Article now departs from the
world of CSR and corporate regulation and turns to social enterprise in Europe, focusing on how the social enterprise movement manifests itself in
European corporate law.
II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE: SOCIAL COOPERATIVES AND THE
COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY
A. Introduction to European Social Enterprise
Europe is the birthplace of modern social enterprise, having arisen out
of traditional concepts of social cooperation.233 In general, the modern European movement is defined by different types of social cooperatives aimed
at providing work integration services and personal services for the disadvantaged.234 Jacques Defourny identifies the Italian Parliament’s enactment
of the “social solidarity cooperative” in 1991 as the beginning of the modern social enterprise movement in Europe.235 In Italy, these organizations
quickly gained acceptance. As of 2005, Italy was home to more than 7300
social cooperatives employing some 244,000 people.236 Other European
countries quickly followed Italy’s lead and enacted their own social cooperative organizations.237
This Part traces the development of social enterprise in Europe during the
preceding two decades. In doing so, this Part contrasts the social cooperatives
of continental Europe with the United Kingdom’s Community Interest Companies (CICs) and identifies a recent resurgence in social enterprise in the wake
of a global recession. This Part concludes by outlining the European Parliament’s efforts to use social enterprise as a tool to boost the European economy.
233

See Defourny, supra note 27.
See generally Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31.
235
Id. at 205–06. The Italian law identifies two types of social cooperatives, to wit:
(1) cooperative sociali di tipo a (“Type-A Social Cooperatives”), which provide social,
health and educational services; and (2) cooperative sociali di tipo b (“Type-B Social
Cooperatives”), which provide work integration for disadvantaged people. Id. at 205.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 206.
234
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B. Social Cooperatives
Social cooperatives are the most widespread social enterprise entities in
Europe. Since 1991, nearly every European jurisdiction has authorized its
own social cooperative entity.238 However, the concept of social enterprise
in Europe remains narrowly interpreted as a synonym for charitable work.239
As a result, the majority of the social enterprise sector in Europe focuses on
social, not environmental, problems. Furthermore, like charities, social cooperatives are generally prohibited from distributing profits to shareholders.240 The result of these policies is generally a work integration social enterprise (WISE), the most popular type of social cooperative in Europe,
whose singular goal “is to help low-qualified unemployed people, who are
at risk of permanent exclusion from the labour market.”241
For example, WISEs have been available to social entrepreneurs in Portugal and Spain for over a decade. In 1997, Portugal authorized the cooperativa
de solidariedade social (social solidarity cooperative),242 and in 1999, Spain
created the cooperativa de iniciativa social (social initiative cooperative).243
Some social cooperatives were introduced to tackle very specific issues.
For example, Greece created the Koinonikos Syneterismos Periorismenis
Eufthinis, KoiSPE (limited liability social co-operative), an entity designed
to promote partnerships between psychiatric hospital workers and individuals with psychosocial disabilities.244 In 2002, France created the société
coopérative d’intérêt collectif, (SCIC) (collective interest co-operative society), a multi-stakeholder cooperative dedicated to local development projects.245 In 2003, Finland introduced the Finnish Act of Social Enterprise,
which created a WISE specifically aimed at creating employment for people with disabilities.246
Belgium, in contrast, has taken a different approach. In 1996, Belgium created the société à finalité sociale, (SFS) (social purpose company) designation247
238

Id. at 206–07; see also EVA HECKL ET AL., STUDY ON PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE SECTOR IN EUROPE 5 (2007) (noting that these new entities are usually
implemented in concert with new regulatory provisions and financial support instruments).
239
See generally Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 206–09.
240
See infra Part IV; Fei, supra note 24, at 37 (observing that “in continental Europe the
phrase [social enterprise] often has a narrower meaning, sometimes conditioned on the
presence of specific attributes in the enterprise with less emphasis on its business aspects”).
241
Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 207.
242
Id. at 206.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 208.
247
Id. at 206.
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and introduced project grants for environmental cooperatives engaged in the
recycling and reuse of materials.248 As the term “designation” suggests, Belgium’s legislation did not create a new corporate entity, but rather created a
certification available to all types of business organizations. In order to obtain this certification, the organization must define a profit allocation policy
and permit employee participation in the organization’s governance structure
through ownership of capital shares.249
More recently, social cooperatives have spread to central and eastern European countries. Defourny argues that the growth of social enterprise in eastern European countries lagged behind their western counterparts due in large
part to cultural and legal obstacles that remained after the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1989.250 He highlights several obstacles to social enterprise in eastern Europe, including cultural opposition and skepticism to cooperative
forms, excessive dependence on donor contributions, the absence of legal
frameworks to regulate cooperatives, a general lack of confidence in solidarity movements, and the predominance of parochial political cultures that eschewed alternative corporate governance structures.251 Despite these barriers,
Defourny estimates that half of all central and eastern European states have
enacted at least one new cooperative organization in recent years.252
A review of the emergence of social cooperatives throughout Europe
makes clear that these new entities enjoy near-universal support. Social
cooperatives are designed to encourage “entrepreneurial and commercial
dynamics that are an integral part of a social project ... provid[ing] a way
of formalising the multi-stakeholder nature of numerous initiatives.”253
However, this narrow view of social enterprise has not succeeded in addressing local or regional environmental concerns, nor has it encouraged
social cooperatives to expand into the growing sectors of low-carbon energy production or so-called “clean technology.” Moreover, countries that
248

See HECKL ET AL., supra note 238, at 27.
Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 206–07. Defourny and Nyssens criticize this
approach as unsuccessful, explaining that it “involve[s] a considerable number of requirements ... without bringing a real value added for the concerned organizations.” Id. at
207. In a similar vein, other European countries offer government-sponsored awards to
corporations in an effort to induce them to make significant contributions to sustainability
or human rights issues. ZERK, supra note 43, at 194. Examples of such awards can be found
in the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and the UK. Id. While these government-sponsored
awards are available to any organization, social cooperatives appear to be uniquely positioned to take advantage of these awards given their social purpose, community involvement, and innovative business models.
250
Defourny, supra note 27.
251
Id.
252
Id. (identifying examples in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia).
253
Id.
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have explored alternative corporate designations, like Belgium, have not
proved successful. Belgium’s SFS designation imposes restrictions on profit
distribution but does not offer any advantages for raising capital other than
the branding value associated with the designation.254 As Matthew Doeringer
notes, in the eight years following the creation of the SFS designation,
“only 400 SFSs registered with the Belgian government.”255
Thus, while social cooperatives dominate continental Europe, the adherence to the narrow view of social enterprise has hamstrung a movement seeking to offer alternative business models in many areas beyond work integration. The United Kingdom has taken a markedly different approach. A decade
ago, the U.K. adopted a view of for-profit, mission-driven social enterprise,
and it now enjoys the most robust social enterprise sector in Europe.256
C. Community Interest Companies (CICs)
In 2010, Stephen Lloyd, one of the architects of the CIC, explained
that the idea for this entity arose out of a growing sense of frustration with
corporate law in the U.K.257 Lloyd noted that traditional English corporate
law made it “quite complicated to embed social purposes in a legal form because there was not an off-the-shelf, simple-to-use legal entity ready for social enterprise unless you used the old-fashioned industrial and provident
societies—the law for which has not been updated since 1965.”258 Lloyd
proposed the creation of just such an “off-the-shelf” entity for social entrepreneurs, the CIC.259
In 2001, the British government “established the Social Enterprise Unit
... to identify barriers to the growth of the social-enterprise sector ... and to
develop strategies to overcome these obstacles.”260 In its first report, issued one year later, the Unit defined social enterprise as “a business with
primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for
that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven
by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.”261 In contrast
254

Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International
Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 309 (2010).
255
Id.
256
HECKL ET AL., supra note 238, at 12; see also Doeringer, supra note 254, at 309–10.
257
Stephen Lloyd, Transcript: Creating the CIC, 35 VT. L. REV. 31, 31–32 (2010).
258
Id. at 33.
259
See id. (describing his vision of the CIC as “piggybacking” on legislation already in
place for existing companies).
260
Doeringer, supra note 254, at 310.
261
OFFICE OF THE THIRD SECTOR, CABINET OFFICE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN:
SCALING NEW HEIGHTS 10 (2006) [hereinafter SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN], http://web

2013]

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE REVOLUTION

675

to continental Europe’s definition, the Unit’s definition does not relegate social enterprise to work integration and, importantly, permits profit distribution.
With popular and government support behind the Social Enterprise
Unit’s conclusions, policies were quickly put into place to foster the growth
of social enterprise in the U.K. These included the creation of a website, the
opening of regional social enterprise development centers, the selection of
thirty-five social enterprise ambassadors tasked with spreading information
in local communities, the establishment of a £10 million fund for investment in social enterprise, and the creation of programs to develop better
metrics for valuing the social benefits produced by social enterprise.262
Most importantly, Parliament followed through with the Unit’s suggestion to create a corporate entity specifically designed for social enterprise.263
Three years after the creation of the Unit, Parliament authorized the CIC as
part of the 2004 Companies Act.264 In general, the CIC is a limited company,
with governance primarily enshrined in the board of directors,265 but subject
to restrictions designed to ensure that it will serve community interests.266
These restrictions operate on both the entity and regulatory levels. At
the entity level, a social entrepreneur incorporating a CIC has two choices,
to limit the CIC by guarantee or by shares.267 If limited by guarantee, the
CIC adopts a charitable model by guaranteeing that all profits will be reinvested in the company.268 If limited by shares, the CIC embraces a blended
value model and operates like a traditional limited company.269 CICs limited by shares are permitted to raise equity and distribute dividends to
shareholders, capped at 35% of the aggregate total company profits.270

archive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070108124358/http:/cabinetoffice.gov.uk/third_sector/docum
ents/social_enterprise/se_action_plan_2006.pdf; see also Doeringer, supra note 254, at 310.
262
See SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ACTION PLAN, supra note 261, at 5; Doeringer, supra note
254, at 310–11.
263
Doeringer, supra note 254, at 312.
264
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27,
§ 26 (U.K.) [hereinafter Companies Act].
265
Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 619, 632 (2010).
266
Reiser, supra note 265, at 634–35.
267
Lloyd, supra note 257, at 40–41; Reiser, supra note 265, at 631.
268
See Reiser, supra note 265, at 631 (discussing how companies limited by guarantee
are similar to U.S. nonprofits).
269
See Lloyd, supra note 257, at 41 (discussing how CICs limited by shares can distribute
equity to investors).
270
Reiser, supra note 265, at 635 (adding that the dividend restrictions have recently been
revised by the CIC Regulator).
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At the regulatory level, all CICs are overseen by the CIC Regulator.271
As a procedural matter, CICs must first register with the Companies House,
a government registry in the U.K. similar to the Secretaries of State in the
United States.272 Founders of CICs must also sign a Community Interest
Statement detailing how they will deliver a “community purpose.”273 CIC
directors are thereafter responsible for submitting annual reports to the CIC
Regulator, which must “confirm that access to the benefits it provides will
not be confined to an unduly restricted group.”274 The overarching goal of
CIC regulation is to ensure compliance with the so-called “Community Interest Test,” to wit: whether “a reasonable person might consider [the] activity [as] being carried on [by the CIC] for the benefit of the community.”275
The CIC Regulator, who is appointed by the Secretary of State for Business
and Innovation,276 is responsible for maintaining public confidence in the
CIC brand277 and enforcing the community interest test.278 To that end, the
CIC Regulator has “surprisingly wide”279 powers to intervene in CIC operations, including ordering independent audits at the Regulator’s expense,280
commencing civil proceedings to intervene in the CIC’s affairs,281 removing
directors,282 and appointing a “manager” to run the CIC after the directors
have been removed.283
In addition to government regulation, CICs are also subject to an “asset
lock.”284 The asset lock caps shareholder dividends,285 and imposes a duty
271

Id. at 630–31.
Lloyd, supra note 257, at 35.
273
Id.
274
Reiser, supra note 265, at 633 (quoting THE REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST
COMPANIES, DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8 (Oct.
2009), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator
/docs/leaflets/09-1648-community-interest-companies-frequently-asked-questions-leaflet.pdf).
275
The Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788, art. 2, ¶ 4
(U.K.); see also Lloyd, supra note 257, at 34–35.
276
Lloyd, supra note 257, at 38 (citing Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community
Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, § 29-40A (U.K.)).
277
Companies Act, § 41.
278
See id. § 36A; see also Lloyd, supra note 257, at 38–39 (discussing the CIC Regulator’s powers, including the ability to take over CIC property if the Regulator becomes convinced the CIC has lost its community purpose).
279
Lloyd, supra note 257, at 38; cf. OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST
COMPANIES, DEP’T TRADE & INDUS., COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES 10–11 (Jan.
2005), http://www.dti.gov.uk/cics/pdfs/cicfactsheet2.pdf (stating that regulation of CICs
will be by a “light touch”); Reiser, supra note 265, at 631.
280
Companies Act, §§ 26, 43.
281
See id. § 44.
282
Id. § 46.
283
Id. § 47; see also Lloyd, supra note 257, at 39 (referring to this manager as a receiver).
284
Companies Act, § 30; OFFICE OF THE REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COMPANIES,
DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE NOTES § 6.1 (2012)
272
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on CIC directors to ensure that they obtain fair market value on the sale of
any CIC asset.286 In practice, this prevents a CIC’s assets from being raided
by selling them for below-market prices to a for-profit company owned by
the directors, simultaneously turning a considerable profit for the directors
and undermining the community interest goal of the CIC.287 Furthermore, in
the event of dissolution, the asset lock prevents the distribution of assets to
directors, members, or equity holders.288 Instead, all assets must go to another entity whose assets are similarly “locked” into community benefits.289
Unlike many social cooperatives, which include stakeholder governance
requirements, CICs are encouraged, but not required, to include stakeholder
groups in their decision-making processes.290 The CIC Regulator strongly
encourages several techniques designed to incorporate stakeholders in
governance, such as circulating newsletters, holding stakeholder meetings,
establishing interactive websites, or giving certain stakeholder groups standing in the CIC’s organic documents by requiring that they be consulted before
CIC directors make certain types of decisions.291 While none of these stakeholder integration techniques are mandated, all CICs must make some efforts
and detail those efforts in the annual report submitted to the CIC Regulator.292
Thus, in contrast to continental Europe’s social cooperatives, the U.K.’s
CIC embraces a blended-value interpretation of social enterprise. Since 2004,
CICs have grown faster than any social enterprise entity in Europe. In less
than two years after its enactment, there were over 1000 CICs in the U.K.293
As of April 2012, there were nearly 6400 registered CICs,294 representing
[hereinafter INFORMATION & GUIDANCE NOTES], available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/
cicregulator/docs/guidance/12-1149-community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-6-the-a
sset-lock.pdf; see also Lloyd, supra note 257, at 38; Reiser, supra note 265, at 634–35.
285
Lloyd, supra note 257, at 38.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Reiser, supra note 265, at 635; see also INFORMATION & GUIDANCE NOTES, supra
note 284, § 10.5.2, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/docs/guidance
/11-959-community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-10-transfer-of-assets-and-ceasing
-to-be-a-cic.pdf.
289
Reiser, supra note 265, at 635.
290
INFORMATION & GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 284, § 9.1.3, available at http://www
.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/docs/guidance/11-958-community-interest-companies-guid
ance-chapter-9-corporate-governance.pdf; see also Reiser, supra note 265, at 633.
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INFORMATION & GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 284, § 9.2, available at http://www.bis
.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/docs/guidance/11-958-community-interest-companies-guidance-ch
apter-9-corporate-governance.pdf; see also Reiser, supra note 265, at 634.
292
Reiser, supra note 265, at 634.
293
Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 31, at 205.
294
Community Interest Companies Register, DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/cicregulator/cic-register
(last updated Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter CIC Register].
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more than double the rate of anticipated growth.295 This accelerated growth
is due in large part to the flexibility of CICs to operate in virtually any economic sector. Indeed, CICs have succeeded in agriculture, manufacturing,
nurseries, and environmental projects like waste recycling, low-carbon micro-generation energy systems, and wind farms.296
Despite the growth and popularity of the CIC, some commentators suggest the entity is too restrictive. Doeringer notes that the ECT Group, one of
the early success stories of the CIC form and the U.K.’s largest CIC in 2006
and 2007, suffered adversely from the dividend restrictions and found it difficult to raise capital in equity markets.297 By 2008, the ECT Group was forced
to sell nearly all of its assets to cover its debt.298 Dana Brakman Reiser has
also criticized the dividend restrictions, contending that CICs offer investors
the opportunity to hold shares in a CIC but entitle the owners of such shares
to receive “midstream profits only—and these profits remain capped.”299
CICs do not confer any tax benefits beyond those available to traditional
companies, and they are subject to entity-level taxes despite their dedication to
charitable goals.300 Stephen Lloyd has argued that tax breaks are necessary
to encourage investment in CICs, in particular so-called “patient capital”—socially responsible investors looking for a “long term, bond rate of
return.”301 In the absence of tax breaks, Lloyd, Michael Webber, and Arthur
Wood have advocated for a new entity, the social enterprise limited liability
partnership (SELLP), which would provide entrepreneurs with a pass-through
tax entity to pursue the blended value missions of their enterprises.302
While the CIC may require some fine-tuning, its current structure has
achieved considerable success. Although some have questioned the sustainability of this growth,303 CICs continue to flourish in the traditionally charitable
295

Lloyd, supra note 257, at 39.
Id. at 40.
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Doeringer, supra note 254, at 315.
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Reiser, supra note 265, at 648.
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See Lloyd, supra note 257, at 41–42; Reiser, supra note 265, at 632.
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Lloyd, supra note 257, at 42.
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Stephen Lloyd, The Social Enterprise LLP—What Is It?; And What Is It For?,
BARRISTER MAG., http://www.barristermagazine.com/archive-articles/issue-48/the-social-e
nterprise-llp-%E2%80%93-what-is-it;-and-what-is-it-for.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(explaining that “it is necessary to create a simple to use, cheap legal structure so as to
combine charitable, government and private sector funding under one umbrella so as to
achieve social goals as well as paying financial returns in a tax efficient structure. The
SELLP is expressly designed to address this challenge.”).
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Dennis R. Young, Can Social Enterprises Remain Sustainable and Mission-Focused?
Applying Resiliency Theory, presented at the International Society for Third-Sector Research
10th International Conference (2012) (abstract available at http://www.istr.org/?SienaAbstracts).
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areas, as well as in the private sector. This flexibility may alleviate concerns
about the sustainability of the CIC and mitigate funding issues in certain
sectors. While tax breaks or a refined dividend capping system might foster
further investment in CICs, it appears that such reforms are not immediately
necessary to fulfill the community interest goals already being achieved by
thousands of CICs across the U.K.
D. The Future of Social Enterprise in Europe
Recently, the European Union (EU) acknowledged that its efforts to
produce an efficient “internal market” have fallen short of expectations.304
These shortcomings are painfully obvious in the current European economy,
particularly in the so-called “PIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain).305
To remedy these shortcomings, the EU adopted a “Europe 2020” strategy,306 which sets goals for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.”307 In
order to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, the European Commission
released several communications to the European Parliament advocating
“measures likely to foster growth and employment.”308 These measures
were set forth in the Commission’s April 13, 2011 communication entitled
Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence.309 Given the relative success of social cooperatives and CICs, it is
not surprising that one of these “levers” is social entrepreneurship.310
To that end, the Commission suggested comprehensive European legislation to develop a framework for social investment funds, which would “scale
up the impact of national initiatives by opening Single Market opportunities”311 to investors from all Member States. In this way, the Commission
hopes to build upon the growing trend of social enterprise by promoting societal concerns such as social, ethical, and environmental development over
financial profit.312 Indeed, the Commission estimated that social cooperatives
represent more than 4.8 million European jobs, and it believed that many
more can be created to stem the rising tide of unemployment.313
304

See Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence,
at 24–25, COM (2011) 206 final (Apr. 13, 2011).
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See Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, at 2,
COM (2010) 2020 final (Mar. 3, 2010).
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308
Single Market Act, supra note 304, at 3.
309
Id.
310
Id. at 14–15.
311
Id. at 14.
312
Id. at 14–15.
313
Id. at 15 n.49.

680

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:639

In keeping with continental Europe’s charity-centric view of social enterprise, the European Commission released a “Social Business Initiative”
to operate within the framework of the European Platform against Poverty
and Social Exclusion.314 Notably, the Commission emphasized a 2009 study
that concluded that approximately one in four businesses founded in Europe
fall under the umbrella of social enterprise.315 The Social Business Initiative
addressed several shortcomings of the current social enterprise sector and
set forth an action plan to address these concerns. First, echoing the suggestions of the “Twelve Levers” communication, the Commission suggested
creating a regulatory framework for investment vehicles at the European
level to increase private funding to social enterprises.316 This includes a
proposal for a €90 million financial instrument to facilitate cross-border
funding for the start-up, development, and expansion of social enterprises.317 Second, to increase the visibility of social enterprise, the Commission
suggested identifying best practices in the sector, creating a public database
of labels and certifications, and the promotion of mutual learning and capacity building at the national and regional level.318 Third, to improve the legal
environment, the Commission proposed reforming the Statute for a European
Cooperative Society to simplify regulation and conducting a study on the status
of social cooperatives in all Member States.319 Lastly, to facilitate government
funding of social enterprise, the Commission suggested simplifying the rules
regarding State aid to work integration and personal services, and enhancing
social and health elements in the government procurement process.320
These communications make clear that Europe’s governing bodies are
increasingly serious about fostering the growth of social enterprise. Creating
a Europe-wide regulatory scheme and regional investment funds appear to
be necessary steps to elevate social enterprise from the national level to the
regional level. However, whether the European Parliament follows through
with these suggestions remains to be seen.
For the moment, European social enterprise operates on the local and state
levels. The legal landscape continues to be a patchwork of social cooperatives
314

Social Business Initiative: Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, Key
Stakeholders in the Social Economy and Innovation, at 2, COM (2011) 682 final (Oct. 25,
2011) [hereinafter Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises].
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Id. at 3; see also SIRI TERJESEN ET AL., GLOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR,
2009 REPORT ON SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 20 (2009), available at http://www.gemcon
sortium.org/docs/download/2519.
316
Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, supra note 314, at 6–7.
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Id. at 8.
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Id.; see also CIC Register, supra note 294.
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Creating a Favourable Climate for Social Enterprises, supra note 314, at 10.
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See id. at 10–11.
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and designations that enjoy varying degrees of success. The U.K.’s CIC,
however, appears to confirm that embracing minimal profit distribution has
been a key factor in the expansion and success of social enterprise. Despite
this conclusion, the suggestions of the European Commission continue to reflect a narrow view of social enterprises as strictly charitable organizations.
Indeed, the prohibition on profit distribution and the rejection of blendedvalue models will likely impede the growth of social enterprise in an economic climate that cries out for innovation and mold-breaking approaches.
In contrast, the next Part explores the recent emergence of social enterprise
entities in the United States, which bear a much closer resemblance to the
U.K. than continental Europe.
III. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. First Generation Entities
In contrast with Europe, where social enterprise entities have been in existence for decades, the social enterprise revolution in corporate law in the
United States is still in its early stages.321 However, the past five years have
witnessed significant growth in both financing for social enterprise and increased diversity along the spectrum of entities offered to social entrepreneurs. Indeed, socially responsible investments grew more than 13% in the
face of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression,322 and account for more than $3 trillion in professionally managed assets in the United
States.323
A number of entities have been authorized in U.S. jurisdictions that purportedly serve the mission-driven purpose of social entrepreneurs,324 and
unlike Europe, these entities are not subject to a prohibition on the distribution of profits to shareholders. In the United States, social enterprise and its
accompanying entities constitute a so-called “fourth sector” of the economy325 uniquely committed to simultaneously earning profits for shareholders
321

See Sarah Stankorb, Where Did Social Enterprise Come From Anyway?, GOOD (Mar.
8, 2012), http://www.good.is/post/where-did-social-enterprise-come-from-anyway (quoting
Jay Coen Gilbert, co-founder of B Labs: “this was a long process of gestation”).
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See 2010 US-SIF REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
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See generally infra Part III.B–E (discussing L3Cs, Flexible Purpose Corporations,
Social Purpose Corporations, and Benefit Corporations).
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Kelley, supra note 7, at 340 (“According to [proponents of social enterprise], we are in
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and creating social and environmental benefits.326 This Part identifies and discusses four recently enacted social enterprise entities, to wit: (1) Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies (L3Cs), (2) Flexible Purpose Corporations
(FPCs), (3) Social Purpose Corporations (SPCs), and (4) Benefit Corporations.
B. L3Cs
In 2008, Vermont became the first state to enact the L3C.327 Several
other states quickly followed suit. At the time of this writing, L3Cs have
been enacted in six states and two Native American nations,328 and they are
under consideration in at least twelve state legislatures.329 In general, L3C
legislation amends a state’s existing Limited Liability Company (LLC) statute, creating a specific type of LLC subject to certain restrictions designed
to create a safe and reliable corporate entity for receiving Program Related
Investments (PRIs) from private foundations.330 In order for an organization
Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforcement,
Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2011).
326
Defourny, supra note 27, at 5.
327
Jim Condos, Vermont Secretary of State, Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, VT.
SECRETARY OF ST. (2004), http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (2012).
328
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); Limited
Liability Companies, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1302 (2010); Low-Profit Limited Liability
Company, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 31, § 1611 (2010); Michigan Limited Liability Company Act,
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.4102 (2009); North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-01 (2010). In addition, the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Crow Indian Nation
of Montana have also enacted L3C legislation. Laws, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://
www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). Utah and
Wyoming enacted similar legislation, their L3C acts were subsequently repealed. Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-412 (West 2009); Limited Liability
Companies, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102 (2009).
329
See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on
the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 880 n.7 (2010) (listing the twelve states in which L3C legislation is currently under consideration).
330
See MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS
36 (2011); Doeringer, supra note 254, at 319 (describing the primary purpose of the L3C as
making it cheaper and easier for foundations to determine where they can invest with PRIs,
thus increasing available capital for social enterprise); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal,
The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially
Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 282
(2010) (“The L3C promoters seek to use this highly malleable LLC form to accomplish
another goal, namely allowing private foundations to increase their PRIs and thereby to
provide social benefit.”); Kleinberger, supra note 329, at 884 (“L3C proponents claim that
L3C status will streamline the PRI process.”); Reiser, supra note 265, at 622 (discussing how
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to qualify as a L3C, the entity’s articles of incorporation must contain certain provisions, including: (1) stating a primary charitable or educational purpose, (2) conversely stating that the entity does not have a significant purpose
for the production of income or appreciation of property, and (3) stating that
the entity does not have a political or legislative purpose.331 In addition, most
states require that an L3C include the “L3C” designation in its name.332
To fully understand the L3C, one must first understand the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions relevant to 501(c)(3) tax-exempt entities. Of the
twenty-eight types of organizations entitled to be tax-exempt under the IRC,
the 501(c)(3) entities are the most common, and are divided into two categories: private foundations and public charities.333 All 501(c)(3)s are subject to the prohibition on private inurement to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual.334 Private foundations, unlike charities, are subject to stricter regulations and graduated excise taxes,335 but they are permitted to take advantage of PRIs, which have been part of nonprofit law since
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.336
In short, PRIs are a way for grant-making foundations to make tax-free
jeopardy investments in socially beneficial businesses rather than making traditional grants to charities.337 When a foundation makes a PRI, the IRS permits the foundation to count that grant towards the 5% of the foundation’s
assets it is required to distribute annually, on pain of excise taxes and potential loss of tax-exempt status.338 While PRIs offer foundations the option of
the L3C model was conceived as easily meshing with existing state LLC statutes and how it
was to contain sufficient restrictions to enable L3Cs to qualify for receipt of PRIs under
existing IRS rules).
331
LANE, supra note 330, at 35.
332
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3005(a)(2) (2012).
333
Fishman, supra note 26, at 568.
334
Id. at 584.
335
Id. at 582 (“Sections 4940 to 4945 were added to the IRC and imposed a sliding
scale of excise taxes (depending upon the offending foundation’s willingness to correct
its wrong) for abuses in which Congress felt private foundations were most likely to
engage.”). For a more thorough discussion of the excise tax provisions applicable to
private foundations, see Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 53.4944, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3).
336
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 4944(c), 83 Stat. 487, 512 (1969).
337
See Doeringer, supra note 254, at 317. Notably, the Ford Foundation has committed
over $400 million in PRIs since pioneering the practice in 1968. See FORD FOUND.,
INVESTING FOR SOCIAL GAIN: REFLECTIONS ON TWO DECADES OF PROGRAM-RELATED
INVESTMENTS 12 (1991).
338
See I.R.C. § 4944 (2007); see also, e.g., I.R.C. § 4942 (2007) (providing that if a
foundation does not fulfill the 5% distribution requirement, it can be liable for a 100% tax
on the undistributed amount).
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making jeopardy investments to satisfy the 5% annual asset distribution requirement, the IRS has, until very recently, offered little guidance on what
investments qualify as PRIs. In fact, the IRS has issued only one Private Letter Ruling concerning a PRI to a LLC339 and has yet to issue any to a L3C.340
The historic confusion about tax treatment of PRIs has led to a reluctance on the part of foundations to actively pursue PRIs for fear of tax
risks.341 Indeed, such investments may be labeled “jeopardizing” by the IRS
and incur the corresponding 5% tax on the investment.342 Alternatively, the
IRS may determine that the entity receiving the PRI does not adequately further an exempt purpose. Such an investment would be subject to the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) and would incur a corporate income tax on
the profits earned from any nonexempt business activities.343 Moreover, the
investment would not count towards the foundation’s 5% distribution requirement,344 and it would also potentially incur a 20% tax on taxable expenditures.345 As a result, many foundations have remained reluctant to distribute their assets via PRIs and instead opt for the safer course of simply
distributing assets to charities.346
In an attempt to encourage foundations to increase their PRIs to social
enterprises, drafters of L3C statutes transliterated the PRI requirements into
339

See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-10-020 (Mar. 10, 2006); see also Klienberger,
supra note 329, at 892; Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 25–26.
340
As Matthew Doeringer notes, the dearth of Private Letter Rulings in this regard may
be explained by the fact that the IRS charges $8,700.00 per Private Letter Ruling, and the
accompanying attorneys fees can be as much as $50,000.00. Moreover, foundations may
incur additional costs in connection with investment oversight, as the IRS may require
annual reports confirming the company is using the PRI to further an exempt purpose.
Doeringer, supra note 254, at 318.
341
Lauren Burnhill, More PRI Funding for the BOP? Yes – and You Can Help!, CENTER
FOR FIN. INCLUSION BLOG (May 29, 2012), http://cfi-blog.org/2012/05/29/more-pri-funding
-for-the-bop-yes-and-you-can-help/ (noting that “[f]or fear of endangering their tax status,
most foundations have exclusively focused on making grants to non-profit organizations”).
342
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1 (1972).
343
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(2)-1(b) (1960); see also Katz & Page, Role of Social Enterprise,
supra note 16, at 79 (noting as well that, should a company involve itself in too many unrelated business activities, it can lose the exemption entirely).
344
Doeringer, supra note 254, at 318–19.
345
I.R.C. § 4945(a)(1) (2006). As Callison and Vestal note, there is also a 5% tax on foundation managers, and both taxes increase if the expenditure is not corrected within the statutory
period. Id. § 4845(a)(2)–(b)(2); see also Callison & Vestal, supra note 330, at 278 n.29.
346
Jonathan Greenblatt, Opening the Door for Program Related Investments, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. BLOG (May 11, 2012), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/opening
_the_door_for_program_related_investments (“PRI’s historically have not been used with
much frequency because of confusion as to how they work and the high costs associated
with them.”).

2013]

THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE REVOLUTION

685

the L3C statutes.347 Indeed, L3Cs are required by statute to operate in accordance with IRS standards for organizations that qualify for PRIs.348
While these provisions appear to ameliorate the tax risks posed by PRIs and
give foundations a green light to streamline PRIs into L3Cs free from tax
concerns, many commentators have criticized this approach as insufficient.
J. William Callison and Allan W. Vestal emphasize that Congress has
not amended the IRC’s PRI provisions to explicitly include investments in
L3Cs,349 and they conclude that “without changes to federal PRI rules, the L3C
construct has little or no value.”350 Daniel S. Kleinberger has gone so far as to
suggest that “the ‘L3C’ is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance; its very existence is inherently misleading.”351 He submits that the statutory restrictions
placed on L3Cs are already possible under every state’s flexible LLC statutes,
and that without amendment to the IRC, “L3C legislation does nothing to help
foundations seeking to assure themselves of PRI treatment.”352
J. Haskell Murray and Edward I. Hwang concede this point, but they
counter it by underscoring the fact that an L3C may not abandon its devotion
to PRI requirements without sacrificing its specialized corporate status.353
They contend that tax risks to foundations could be “reduced if prescient
drafting of the foundation-L3C agreement includes a stop-loss provision or
other reinvestment options upon an L3C cessation.”354 While a properly
drafted agreement might reduce some tax risks to foundations, the fact remains that without guidance from the IRS, L3Cs do not live up to their purported ability to streamline the PRI process by providing a reliable PRI receiver. Tyler acknowledges this uncertainty but argues that L3Cs are not enentirely dependent on foundation funding, and that the entity “transcend[s]
foundation involvement.”355 However, Tyler’s argument for transcendence is
hard to square with the almost universally PRI-centric arguments made by
L3C proponents during the legislative process and after its enactment.356
347

Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 26–33.
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that an L3C
“significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes
within the meaning of [I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B)]”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(C) (requiring that an L3C not have the purpose of accomplishing “one or more political or legislative purposes within the meaning of [I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D)]”).
349
Callison & Vestal, supra note 330, at 273–74.
350
Id. at 274.
351
Klienberger, supra note 329, at 881.
352
Id. at 908.
353
See Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 32.
354
Id.
355
Tyler, supra note 21, at 125.
356
The Concept of the L3C, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://americansforcom
munitydevelopment.org/concept.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (“The keys to an L3C’s
348
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In response to these critiques, Reps. Aaron Schock (R-IL) and Jared Polis
(D-CO) introduced the Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2011 (H.R. 3420) on
November 14, 2011.357 Notably, the bill sought to amend the IRC’s definition
of PRIs and provide for administrative review of whether investments qualify
as PRIs.358 The bill was referred to the House Committee on Ways and
Means, and it has yet to emerge; nonetheless, its introduction appears to have
had an impact. In fact, on April 19, 2012, the IRS released a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding PRIs.359 The proposed regulations add nine new
examples that “illustrate that a wider range of investments qualify as PRIs
than the range currently presented in § 53.4944-3(b) ... [and] demonstrate that
a PRI may accomplish a variety of charitable purposes.”360 These examples
illustrate new PRI principles, to wit: (1) PRIs may be made to activities furthering charitable purposes in foreign countries, (2) PRIs are not limited to
situations involving economically disadvantaged individuals or deteriorated
urban areas, (3) a potentially high rate of return on investment does not automatically prevent an investment from being considered a PRI, and (4) PRIs
can be achieved through a variety of investment instruments, “including loans
to individuals, tax-exempt organizations and for-profit organizations, and equity investments in for-profit organizations.”361 Most importantly, the IRS has
stated that taxpayers may rely on these examples “before these proposed regulations are finalized.”362
While the L3C is not explicitly mentioned in the proposed amendments to
§ 53.4944-3(b), some of the examples do appear to apply to L3Cs. Example
16 posits a hypothetical in which X, an LLC, purchases coffee from poor
farmers residing in a developing country.363 Y, a private foundation, makes a
low-interest loan to X to fund the provision of efficient water, pest and farm
operation is its use of low-cost foundation capital in a high risk tranche of its structure and
its ability to allocate risk and reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensuring
some a very safe investment with market return. As is appropriate under the PRI structure,
foundations would normally be expected to assume the highest risk at very low return, making
the rest of the investment far more secure.”); see also Klienberger, supra note 329, at 894 n.72
(identifying the remarks of several legislators focusing on the L3C’s supposed PRI fast track).
357
The Philanthropic Facilitation Act of 2011, H.R. 3420, 112th Cong. (2011).
358
Id.; see also Westaway, supra note 26.
359
Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944, 77 Fed.
Reg. 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3).
360
Id. at 23,430.
361
Id. at 23,429–30; see also Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the Fledgling L3C Corporate Form, FORBES, May 4, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/04/irs
-rules-could-help-the-fledgling-l3c/.
362
Examples of Program-Related Investments, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 23,429 (Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 53.4944-3).
363
Id. at 23,431.
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management, and crop cultivation.364 Because Y’s primary purpose in making the loan is the education of poor farmers, and not the production of income, the loan significantly furthers Y’s exempt activities and qualifies as a
PRI.365 This example illustrates several principles: first, foundations may
safely make PRIs to LLCs and, in theory, L3Cs; second, PRIs may be made
to further educational and environmental purposes; and third, PRIs may be
made to organizations with operations outside the United States.
The impact these examples will have on the PRI practices of private
foundations remains unclear. However, the amendments and accompanying
principles do address many concerns regarding the tax consequences of
PRIs and appear to provide assurances for tax treatment of potential investments. Indeed, these new examples may signal the alignment of substance
and form and usher in a new era of tranched investments in L3Cs and other
mission-driven entities. However, such an outcome might also have negative effects on existing nonprofits, particularly public charities that already
rely heavily on foundation funding.366 Is social enterprise at the expense of
traditional charity a desirable outcome?367 This question raises much broader issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, but to the extent the IRS
has succeeded in alleviating the tax concerns regarding L3Cs and opened
the floodgates for PRIs, these issues merit a thoughtful discussion.
Looking beyond the funding issues associated with L3Cs, other commentators have criticized the governance structure of these entities. Some
scholars have noted that the dual charitable and financial purposes of
L3Cs “invite an apparent conflict of fiduciary duties”368 and leave directors with little guidance regarding how to prioritize these duties when confronted with competing financial goals and tax-exempt purposes.369 John
Tyler dubs this the “problem of two masters” and argues that L3C statutes
“clearly impose an unambiguous ordering of fiduciary priorities[:] ... the
theory and purpose of the L3C [is to] prioritize charitable, exempt purposes as a fiduciary matter.”370 Thus, in Tyler’s view, the charitable purpose
trumps shareholder wealth-maximization, a conclusion that appears consistent

364

Id.
Id.
366
See Anurag Gupta, Note, L3Cs and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the
Field Between Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
203, 220 (2011).
367
Id.
368
Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 32.
369
See id.; Kleinberger, supra note 329, at 900.
370
Tyler, supra note 21, at 141.
365
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with the “low-profit” moniker of the L3C.371 Murray and Hwang share this
view and argue that fiduciary duties imposed on managers of L3Cs should
be modeled after the fiduciary duties imposed on nonprofit managers.372
While this interpretation might provide some guidance at the highest levels of L3C governance, it still leaves much to be desired in the context of
implementation on a day-to-day basis, and it does not adequately address
how and to what extent the preeminence of charitable purposes effects directors’ duties of care and loyalty. Some commentators embrace this apparent conflict and see it as a benefit that encourages “a candid harmonization of goals.”373 L3Cs would certainly invite a candid harmonization, but
legitimate concern regarding the governance of L3Cs and managers’ fiduciary duties may pose another hurdle for L3C proponents, notwithstanding
any amendment to the IRC.
In sum, the L3C has been the most widely criticized social enterprise
entity. However, recent developments appear to address some of the tax
concerns regarding L3C funding. Despite this progress, legitimate questions
remain about L3C governance and the fiduciary duties of L3C managers. At
the moment, the L3C may be the right choice of entity for some social entrepreneurs with foundation support, but it is likely burdened by too much
uncertainty for many aspiring social entrepreneurs.
C. Flexible Purpose Corporations
October 9, 2011 was a landmark day for emerging corporate entities in
California. On that day, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. signed two bills
into law: first, AB 361,374 which made California the sixth state to authorize the benefit corporation,375 and second, SB 201, also known as the Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011.376 The latter provided for a new type of
371

Id.; see also Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 40 (“The PRI requirements built
into the L3C statute mandate that the L3C’s ultimate master be ‘charitable purpose’ ....
When the profit master and the charitable purpose master irreconcilably conflict in the
operation of an L3C, however, the charitable purpose master must rule.”).
372
Murray & Hwang, supra note 325, at 41. Conversely, the authors argue that
enforcement of those duties should resemble for-profit enforcement mechanisms, including
affording directors of L3Cs the protection of the business judgment rule. Id.
373
LANE, supra note 330, at 42.
374
See Complete Bill History of AB 361, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://www.leg
info.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab_361_bill_20111009_history.html
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).
375
Sven Eberlein, The Start of a Revolution, DAILY KOS (Jan. 11, 2012, 3:46 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/01/11/1053080/-The-Start-of-a-Revolution.
376
Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–2517 (West 2011).
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corporate entity—namely, the flexible purpose corporation (FPC).377 This
Section explores the governance structure and the liabilities associated with
this new entity.
An FPC may be either publicly traded or closely held,378 and it is required to include the words “flexible purpose corporation” or “FPC” in its
name.379 Its articles of incorporation must include a statement enumerating
the purposes of the FPC.380 Importantly, a FPC must be organized for one
or more of the following purposes: (1) charitable purposes like those nonprofits carry out;381 or (2) promoting positive short-term or long-term effects or minimizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of the FPC’s
activities on its “employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors,” “the
community and society,” and “the environment.”382 These two broadly defined categories offer an FPC substantial discretion to select its blended value purpose and enshrine the hallmark flexibility of this entity in its articles
of incorporation.
In addition to the mandatory provisions discussed above, a FPC’s articles of incorporation may also include several discretionary provisions.
Some of these include setting forth special qualifications for shareholders,383 setting forth a termination date for the FPC,384 restricting the business
in which the FPC engages in,385 or requiring a vote of a larger proportion or
of all the shares of any class or series before the FPC takes “any or all corporate actions.”386 The articles may also limit the liability of directors for money
damages in actions brought by the FPC or derivative actions brought by
shareholders for breach of directorial duties.387 However, these discretionary
limits on liability are subject to numerous exceptions388 and are only available
for directors, not officers, of the FPC.389

377

Id.
Id. § 2503.1. Additionally, FPCs may engage in a wide range of business activities,
commercial or industrial banking, the trust business, or the title insurance business,
subject to the applicable provisions of the California Financial Code. Id. § 2510.
379
Id. § 2602(a).
380
Id. § 2602(b)(1).
381
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2011).
382
Id. § 2602(b)(2)(B)(i)–(iii).
383
Id. § 2603(a)(3).
384
Id. § 2603(a)(4).
385
Id. § 2603(a)(6).
386
Id. § 2603(a)(5).
387
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2603(a)(10) (West 2011).
388
See id. § 2603(a)(10)(A)–(B).
389
Id. § 2603(a)(10)(C).
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Thus, the corporate purpose provisions of the FPC’s authorization statute requires the founders to select at least one charitable, social, or environmental purpose.390 The FPC, like the L3C, may be created for primarily
charitable purposes. The main difference, however, is that where the L3C
is designed to receive PRIs from foundations, the FPC is designed to raise
equity capital.391 Note that nowhere in the FPC statute will one find the
term “low-profit,” nor is there a prohibition or cap on dividends, thus making it more appealing to a broader group of investors. In other words, an
FPC created for a charitable or environmental purpose392 would arguably
qualify for a PRI under the proposed IRS regulations discussed above, but
it may also raise equity capital from socially responsible investors. Thus,
the FPC represents a truly blended corporate form, where the articles of
incorporation enshrine both profit motive and social and environmental
benefits as corporate purposes.
With respect to fiduciary duties, FPC directors are generally obligated to
perform their duties in good faith and with reasonable care “in a manner the
director believes to be in the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation
and its shareholders.”393 In discharging those duties, directors may consider
and give weight to factors the director deems relevant, including the “shortterm and long-term prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders,” and the social
or environmental interests set forth in the articles of incorporation.394 Directors are insulated from liability based upon any alleged failure to act,395 and
stakeholders are explicitly denied a right of action against directors.396
However, creditors and shareholders are given some limited rights of
action against the FPC and its directors, although the extent of liability in
these cases may be capped or subject to indemnification by the FPC. Section 2701 provides limited rights of action for creditors or shareholders of
the FPC.397 A director may also be liable to creditors for distributing assets
390

Id. § 2602(b)(2)(A), (B)(i)–(iii).
See SUSAN H. MAC CORMAC, NEW CORPORATE Forms: FLEXIBLE PURPOSE
CORPORATIONS, BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, AND L3CS, (Berkeley Ctr. for Law, Bus. & Econ.,
Berkeley, Cal., Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/Berkeley
_Handout_1182011_-_1.pdf.
392
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2011).
393
Id. § 2700(a).
394
Id. § 2700(c).
395
Id. § 2700(d).
396
Id. § 2700(f).
397
Id. § 2701(a). For example, a director may be liable to shareholders for making any
distribution to the shareholders contrary to sections 500 to 503 of the California Corporate
Code. Id. § 2701(c)(1).
391
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to shareholders after the institution of dissolution proceedings.398 Moreover,
directors who abstain from voting are deemed to have approved the decision
and do not escape liability for the aforementioned actions.399 However, even
the minimal FPC director liability can effectively be circumvented by virtue
of capping damages and indemnification provisions.400
Accountability of the FPC to its blended corporate purposes is addressed
in its unique reporting requirements. FPC’s are required to issue “annual reports,”401 which must be sent to the shareholders and also be made publicly
available on the FPC’s website.402 The statute requires the annual reports to
include an end-of-year balance sheet and a management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of issues such as the short-term and long-term objectives of the
FPC relating to its specific purpose(s) and the effectiveness of the material
actions taken to achieve those purposes.403 In addition to this annual reporting
requirement, FPCs are also required to issue a “special purpose current report” to the shareholders and the public within forty-five days of a material
action or expenditure related to the FPCs specific purposes.404 These special
purpose reports are designed to ensure FPCs transparency to the shareholders
and the public by identifying and discussing all material expenditures made in
furtherance of the FPC’s special purposes.
The FPC model, however, is not without problems. The corporate purpose categories are certainly flexible, but they may be so broadly drafted that
they risk losing all meaning. This problem is exacerbated by the two-level
reporting structure, which imposes added costs on the FPC without requiring
that the reports be assessed against an independent third-party standard. As
discussed above, this leaves open the possibility of manipulating reported data to the FPC’s advantage while its directors simultaneously benefit from expansive liability protections.405 This point is driven home when one considers
that the board of directors is given sole discretion to determine what information to include in the annual and special purpose reports.406
398

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2701(c)(2) (West 2011).
Id. § 2701(b).
400
Damages obtained from directors in these actions are capped at the amount of the
illegal distribution, or the fair market value of the property at the time of the illegal distribution, plus interest. Id. § 2701(d). Furthermore, a FPC may elect to indemnify any director
from any and all claims pursuant to section 2702(b). Id. § 2702(b).
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Id. § 3500.
402
CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b) (West 2011).
403
Id. § 3500(b)(1)–(5).
404
Id. § 3501.
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See, e.g., id. § 3502(a) (conferring discretion on both management and the board when
providing the information required by section 3501).
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Id.
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The broad limitations on liability also present the problem of accountability to the FPC’s stated social or environmental purposes. As R. Todd Johnson, energy practice leader at Jones Day’s Silicon Valley office, has noted,
the FPC “seeks to unleash directors from the risk of liability, permitting them
to experiment more broadly with the right mix of doing well and doing good,
without concerns of personal or corporate suits.”407 However, it is unclear
whether this experiment will serve the needs of the social enterprise movement. Curiously, the FPC employs a combination of unchecked directorial
power and lack of standardized and independent reporting requirements,
which have historically been poor bedfellows for social and environmental
progress. The FPC’s lack of accountability and specificity may, in turn, create
the impression amongst socially responsible investors that FPCs lack legitimacy. In sum, the FPC may live up to its name as a genuinely “flexible” purpose corporation in the context of director liability and blended corporate
purpose, but the potential for abuse, along with onerous reporting requirements, does little to contribute to the development of social enterprise law.
D. Social Purpose Corporations
On March 30, 2012, three months after its introduction,408 Washington
Governor Chris Gregoire signed Substitute House Bill 2239 (SHB 2239)
into law, which authorized the creation of yet another entity, the social purpose corporation (SPC).409 SPCs, much like FPCs, must include a corporate
purpose statement in their articles of incorporation. All SPCs must be organized as follows: “[I]n a manner intended to promote positive short-term or
long-term effects of, or minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the
corporation’s activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees,
suppliers, or customers; (2) the local, state, national, or world community; or
407

R. Todd Johnson, The Benefit Corporation: A Step in the Right Direction, but ...,
BUS. FOR GOOD (June 12, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://businessforgood.blogspot.com/2010/06
/benefit-corporation-step-in-right.html.
408
House Bill 2239 (HB 2239) was introduced into the Washington State House of
Representatives on January 10, 2012. A companion bill, Senate Bill 6230 (SB 6230), was
introduced on February 15, 2012 in the Washington State Senate. Both bills were quickly
voted through their respective houses. On February 13, 2012, HB 2239 passed in the House
with a vote of 62 yeas, 31 nays, and 5 excused; on March 2, 2012, SB 6230 passed in the
Senate with a vote of 34 yeas, 14 nays, and 1 excused. See H.B. 2239 Establishing Social
Purpose Corporations: History of the Bill, WASH. ST. LEG., http://apps.leg.wa.gov/billinfo
/summary.aspx?bill=2239&year=2011 (last updated Mar. 5, 2013).
409
See S.H.B. 2239, § 1, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps
.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/223
9-S.PL.pdf.
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(3) the environment.”410 This language is similar to the FPC requirement;
however, the category of “charitable purposes” is notably absent. SPCs are
also given the option to select one or more “specific social purposes,” although the bill does not provide a list of examples of such purposes.411
Existing organizations may convert to SPC status,412 provided they
amend their articles of incorporation to include the following: (i) a statement that the corporation is a social purpose corporation; (ii) a statement
setting forth the general social purpose and specific social purposes, if any;
and (iii) the following mission statement: “The mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily compatible with and may be contrary to
maximizing profits and earnings for shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger, acquisition, or other similar actions of the
corporation.”413 These requirements, along with the mandate that a SPC include the term “social purpose corporation” or “SPC” in its name,414 serve to
put any potential investors on notice that the SPC is an entity that may subrogate shareholder value in favor of social or environmental interests. In contrast
with the L3C, where charitable purpose arguably overrides profit maximization, the SPC takes a more flexible approach by giving directors the discretion
to choose social and environmental purposes over profits in all circumstances.
The statute also includes provisions designed to ensure that SPCs retain
their general and specific social purposes. For example, in the event an
amendment to the articles of incorporation is proposed that would materially
alter one or more of the SPC’s social purposes, the bill requires a minimum of
a two-thirds majority to pass the amendment.415 The same applies to situations in which the SPC is involved in a merger or transaction in which it is not
the surviving corporation or one that will dispose of all or substantially all of
its assets.416 In the event such votes succeed, the shareholders of an SPC are
entitled to dissent and obtain a fair market buyout of their shares.417
SPC directors also enjoy limited liability. Directors are shielded from liability against derivative actions for failure to maximize shareholder value

410

Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
412
Id. § 14 (permitting any corporation that is not a SPC to become a SPC, subject to
conditions set forth in § 14(1)(a)–(c)).
413
Id. §§ 5(1)(b)–(e), 14(3) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
414
Id. § 5(1)(a).
415
S.H.B. 2239, § 10, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov
/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/2239-S.PL.pdf
(providing in addition that an SPC may require a greater vote in its articles of incorporation).
416
Id. §§ 11–12.
417
Id. § 13(2)–(3).
411
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by virtue of the mission statement discussed above.418 The statute gives directors the discretion to “consider and give weight to one or more of the social purposes of the corporation as the director deems relevant,”419 and it
provides that any directorial action or failure to act “shall be deemed to be
in the best interests of the corporation” so long as the director reasonably
believes the action “is intended to promote one or more of the social purposes of the corporation.”420 The statute also denies stakeholders a right of
action against directors and officers of SPCs.421
Transparency of SPCs is addressed by requiring them to submit a “social purpose report” to the shareholders and to make the report publicly
available on its website.422 The social purpose report is required to include
a “narrative discussion” regarding the social purposes of the SPC, including its efforts to promote its social purpose.423 Additionally, the report
may include a discussion of the SPC’s short-term and long-term objectives, any “material actions taken by the corporation during the fiscal year
to achieve its social purpose or purposes,” and “[a] description of the financial, operating, or other measures” employed by the SPC for evaluating
its social performance.424 Washington Superior Courts are vested with the
authority to order a social purpose report be furnished to the shareholders
if appropriate notice has been given and the SPC has failed to issue a report for at least two consecutive fiscal years.425
While the intent behind the social purpose reporting requirement is
laudable, the bill does not require that these reports be assessed against independent third-party standards. As a result, SPCs, like FPCs, are held to no
higher a standard than CR reporting, leaving investors in the familiar situation of relying on voluntarily disclosed, unregulated reports assessed against
unstandardized methodologies.426 This risks leaving SPCs and FPCs unaccountable for their blended value goals. However, the SPC’s distinctly antiRevlon, anti-shareholder wealth maximization mission statement is a notable development in social enterprise law. Stronger reporting requirements
can be found in benefit corporation statutes, the topic of the next Section.
418

See id. § 6.
Id. § 6(2).
420
Id. § 6(3).
421
S.H.B. 2239, § 6(4)–(5), 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012), available at http://
apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2011-12/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/
2239-S.PL.pdf.
422
Id. § 16(1).
423
Id. § 16(2).
424
Id.
425
Id. § 16(5).
426
See supra Part II.B.
419
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E. Benefit Corporations
1. Distinguishing “B Corporations” from Benefit Corporations
The benefit corporation has been called the “most ascendant social enterprise innovation today.”427 Like other emerging entities, benefit corporations aim to accommodate both social and financial goals by increasing the
board’s discretion to take social and environmental goals into account when
making business decisions.428 At the time of this writing, benefit corporations
have been enacted in twelve states and the District of Columbia,429 and legislation is currently under consideration in several more jurisdictions.430
The success of the benefit corporation is due in large part to the lobbying efforts of B Labs, a nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting business vehicles for “entrepreneurs and investors seeking to use business to
solve social and environmental problems.”431 In addition to supporting benefit corporation legislation, B Labs has created its own private certification
for “B Corporations.”432 As of March 2013, B Labs has certified 693 B Corporations spanning across sixty industries.433
There is a crucial distinction between “B Corporations” and benefit corporations. B Labs certifies existing organizations that wish to brand themselves as “B Corporations.”434 In contrast, benefit corporations are new
corporate entities authorized under state corporate law.
427

Munch, supra note 78, at 171.
William H. Clark, Jr. & Larry Vranka, The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Cor
poration: Why It Is the Legal Form That Best Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 1 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://benefit
corp.net/storage/documents/The_Need_and_Rationale_for_Benefit_Corporations_April
_2012.pdf.
429
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia have all passed Benefit
Corporation legislation. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
430
Legislatures in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and West Virginia are considering bills to authorize benefit corporations. See id. The District of Columbia introduced benefit corporation legislation on November 15, 2011. See id.; Benefit Corporation
Act of 2011, COUNCIL OF D.C., http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/legislation.aspx?LegNo
=B19-0584 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
431
The Nonprofit Behind B Corps, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b
-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
432
Fei, supra note 24, at 41.
433
B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
434
Fei, supra note 24, at 41–42.
428
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Organizations seeking a “B Corporation” certification must first take a
“B Impact Assessment,” pass an assessment review,435 submit required
documentation and adopt B Labs’ amendments to their articles of incorporation,436 and pay B Labs a certification fee.437 Once the process is complete,
B Labs certifies that the corporation is a “B Corporation,” at which point it
is subject to B Labs’s private regulatory regime that includes randomly selected on-site reviews.438 Additionally, B Corporations are required to prepare an annual public interest report that evaluates its progress in meeting its
stated goals.439
Because it is self-imposed and privately regulated, B Corporation certification does not offer any special tax treatment.440 Moreover, it fails to
grant stakeholders a right of action against the B Corporation to enforce
the mandate that directors consider stakeholder interests when making
business decisions.441 Dana Brakman Reiser opines that shareholders who
invest in a B Corporation because of its social and environmental commitments could serve as a proxy for stakeholder constituencies, but ultimately concludes that B Corporation certification “realistically offers only
moral, rather than legal, assurances to non-shareholder constituencies and
social interests.”442 Therefore, Reiser argues, its most important aspect is
its branding value.443 Because B Corporations are subject to a private
regulatory system, their branding value will be determined by the effectiveness of the regulation. The extent to which the B Corporation brand
succeeds with benefit corporations and the other entities discussed infra,
however, remains to be seen.
435

How to Become a B Corp, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp
/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
436
See Protect Your Mission, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp
/how-to-become-a-b-corp/protect-your-mission (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing a
link to a portion of the site that contains step-by-step instructions, depending on an entity’s
current legal form); cf. Steven J. Haymore, Note, Public(ly Oriented) Companies: B
Corporations and the Delaware Stakeholder Provision Dilemma, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1331,
1323 (2011) (arguing that B Corporations’ future may depend on the compatibility of B
Labs’ stakeholder charter provision with Delaware corporate law).
437
Make It Official, B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to
-become-a-b-corp/120 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
438
Id.
439
Id.
440
Reiser, supra note 265, at 637.
441
Id. at 640–41.
442
Id. at 641–42.
443
See id. at 643; see also Kelley, supra note 7, at 367 (“[T]he primary benefit of the B
designation will be to create a brand for corporations that are truly and fundamentally
committed to socially beneficial outcomes.”).
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2. The Benefit Corporation at a Glance
Thus far, California,444 Hawaii,445 Illionois,446 Louisiana,447 Maryland,448
Massachusetts,449 New Jersey,450 New York,451 Pennsylvania,452 South Carolina,453 Vermont,454 Virginia,455 and the District of Columbia456 have enacted
benefit corporation legislation. All benefit corporation statutes are structured
around four main headings: (1) general provisions, (2) corporate purpose,
(3) accountability, and (4) transparency.457 This Section identifies three fundamental aspects of benefit corporations and then highlights some notable
features specific to certain jurisdictions.
a. Corporate Purpose: Creating General and Specific Public Benefits
Every benefit corporation statute requires that the articles of incorporation include language explaining that the benefit corporation “shall have the
purpose of creating a general public benefit”458 and permits benefit corporations to specify one or more “specific public benefits.”459 “General public
benefit” is defined as a “material positive impact on society and the environment,” measured “against a third-party standard, from the business and
444

See generally CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012).
See generally HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1 to -13 (2012). Hawaii’s statute uses the
term “sustainable business corporation” instead of the “benefit corporation.” Id. § 420D-2.
Unlike the other emerging corporate entities discussed in Parts III.B and III.C, above,
however, this appears to be a distinction without a difference.
446
S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013).
447
See generally Benefit Corporations, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1801–1832 (2012).
448
See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2012).
449
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52 (2012).
450
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to -11 (West 2012).
451
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (McKinney 2012).
452
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301–3331 (2012).
453
See H. 4766, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2012) (amending Title 33 of the 1976 Code
by adding Chapter 38, entitled “South Carolina Benefit Corporation Act”).
454
See generally VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.01–21.14 (2012).
455
See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (2012).
456
D.C. CODE § 29-1301 to -1304 (2013). The District of Columbia approved Bill No.
B19-584 in December 2012 and the bill was sent to the Mayor. The Mayoral Review End
Date is February 11, 2013, at which point the bill is subject to the thirty-day period of
Congressional review as provided by the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, D.C. CODE
§ 1-206.02(c)(1) (2012). Thus, the tentative effective date of the D.C. Benefit Corporation
Act of 2011 is March 13, 2013. See Legislation, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/searchbylegislation.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
457
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2012).
458
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) (West 2012).
459
Id. § 14A:18-5(b).
445
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operations of a benefit corporation.”460 While the exact meaning of this definition has not been addressed by the courts, a notable inclusion is the reference to a third-party standard, which attempts to address concerns regarding
reporting accountability and methodology.
All benefit corporation statutes also define the term “specific public
benefit” by listing the following examples:
(1) Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services;
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business;
(3) Preserving or improving the environment;
(4) Improving human health;
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit purpose; and
(7) Conferring any other particular benefit on society or the environment.461

These examples provide much-needed specificity to both directors and
investors, and their wide range reflects the expansive American view of social
enterprise. Indeed, each list ends with a catch-all provision462 that encourages
the innovation of new or more specific public benefits. More importantly, as
William Clark and Elizabeth Babson note, in treating general and specific
public benefits separately, the statutes ensure that benefit corporations “can
pursue any specific mission, but that the company as a whole is also working
toward general public benefit.”463
The statutes also contain provisions designed to ensure benefit corporations retain their unique corporate purpose. For example, the Vermont statute
requires that the board of directors provide a statement of reasons why it is
proposing a merger or sale in which the surviving corporation is not a benefit corporation.464 Furthermore, many statutes require that a merger or sale
must be approved by, at minimum, a two-thirds vote, or a greater voting
460

N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b) (McKinney 2012). Note, however, that the definition of “general public benefit” contained in the New Jersey statute does not include a reference to a “third-party standard,” although it does require that the annual benefit report be
prepared in accordance with a third-party standard. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(2).
461
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012). The Louisiana statute contains slightly different language regarding specific environmental benefits, to wit: “[p]reserving the environment, promoting positive impacts on the environment, or reducing negative impacts on the
environment.” Benefit Corporations, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803(A)(10)(c) (2012).
462
Id. § 13.1-782(7).
463
Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 841 (noting that this ostensibly ensures that benefit
corporations are not, for example, seeking to reduce waste while increasing carbon emissions).
464
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.06(a)(1) (2012).
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share as required by the articles of incorporation.465 The same two-thirds
voting requirement is also applicable to amendments to the corporate purposes contained in the articles of incorporation, even where the benefit
corporation would retain its social enterprise status.466 These provisions do
not rise to the level of “asset locks,” as it is still possible to overcome these protections and transfer a benefit corporation’s assets to a for-profit organization. However, these heightened requirements may deter potential hostile takeovers or mergers that would separate a benefit corporation’s assets
from its stated social or environmental purposes.
b. Accountability: The Duty to Consider Stakeholder Interests
All benefit corporation statutes also impose an additional duty on directors. In addition to the traditional duty to create value for shareholders,
directors of benefit corporations are also under a duty to consider the effects of their business decisions upon stakeholder groups.467 These stakeholders include the following:
(2) The employees and workforce of the benefit corporations and its subsidiaries and suppliers;
(3) The interests of customers of the benefit corporation as beneficiaries of
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(4) Community and societal considerations, including those of any community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or suppliers are located;
(5) The local and global environment;
(6) The short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation ...; and
(7) The ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general, and any
specific, public benefit purpose.468

While this list is instructive, it does not provide directors with any particular hierarchy by which to evaluate each of these interests.469 In fact, most
465

Id. § 21.06(a)(2).
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14610(d) (West 2012).
467
See, e.g., id. § 14620(b).
468
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(b)(2)–(7). Note however that the Hawaii statute only requires that directors consider the effects of any action on the shareholders and the “accomplishment of general and specific public benefits” of the sustainable business corporation,
and gives directors the discretion for, but does not require, consideration of the six groups
of stakeholder interest. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(1)(2)(A)–(H) (2012). Additionally,
the phrase “the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation” is not included
among the list in the Maryland statute. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07
(LexisNexis 2012).
469
This has been criticized by some commentators as inviting conflicts and confusion as
to how directors should make business decisions. See Cummings, supra note 26, at 606.
466
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benefit corporation statutes explicitly provide that directors are not required to
give priority to any particular group over any other, unless otherwise stated in
the articles of incorporation,470 leaving directors a large degree of flexibility
in this respect. Additionally, directors of benefit corporations are shielded
from liability to the stakeholders whose interests they are obliged to consider.
Most benefit corporation statutes provide that directors have no fiduciary duties to stakeholders, and in this regard they are similar to those of the aforementioned FPC and SPC.471 However, shareholders of benefit corporations
are given an expanded right of action to enforce this additional duty to consider stakeholder interests.472
Thus, the benefit corporation relies on shareholders to act as proxies for
stakeholder groups to ensure compliance with the stated social and environmental purposes of the organization.473 Additionally, the statutes permit benefit
corporations to privilege one or more specific public benefits above others,474
and to grant specific stakeholder groups with a right of action designed to ensure that the directors fulfill their duty to consider stakeholder interests.
c. Transparency: The Annual Benefit Report
The third fundamental element of benefit corporation statutes is the
annual benefit report (ABR). In all states, benefit corporations are required
to submit an ABR to each shareholder475 and, in most cases, to make the
470

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(d); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(a)(3)
(McKinney 2012).
471
See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(e) (2012).
472
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13 (giving shareholders a right of action to
pursue benefit enforcement proceedings, including claims that directors violated their
statutory standard of conduct, which includes giving sufficient consideration to stakeholder interests).
473
Robert A. Wexler & David A. Levitt, Using New Hybrid Legal Forms: Three Case
Studies, Four Important Questions, and a Bunch of Analysis, 69 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
64, 70 (2012), http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf/hybrid.pdf (“[A]n alternative corporate form
makes sense if the founders want the corporation’s board to be free to consider, on a
regular and unlimited basis, a social or charitable mission, without concern about failure
to maximize profits.”).
474
See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications
and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript
at 30), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2115548_code1
725837.pdf?abstractid=2085000&mirid=1 (noting however, that directors may not pursue
a special purpose at the expense of the general public purpose).
475
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630; HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11 (2012); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS § 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11A, § 21.14.
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most recent ABR publicly available on its website.476 The ABR must be
measured against some independent, third party standard477 chosen by the
board. In general, ABRs must include a narrative description of: (1) the ways
in which the benefit corporation pursued both its general and any specific
public benefits during the year, (2) any circumstances that have hindered the
creation of general or specific public benefits, and (3) an assessment of the
social and environmental performance of the benefit corporation.478
The independent standard plays an important role in adding legitimacy
to the benefit corporation’s stated purposes. The drafters took great care to
define “third party standard” to prevent the inherent conflict of interests that
arise when corporations promulgate their own standards or use malleable
industry-friendly standards. The New York statute uses the most common
definition of “third-party standard,” to wit:
[A] recognized standard for defining, reporting and assessing general
public benefit that is:
(1) developed by a person that is independent of the benefit corporation; and
(2) transparent because the following information about the standard is
publicly available:
(A) the factors considered when measuring the performance of a business;
(B) the relative weightings of those factors; and
(C) the identity of the persons who developed and control changes to the
standard and the process by which those changes are made.479

Thus, the third-party standard requirement goes to great lengths to ensure
that the standard-setters are truly independent of the benefit corporation
and its interests.
However, some commentators have criticized this approach, emphasizing that the statutes lack verification requirements and rely on self-reporting.480
Some have argued that this “presents a clear opportunity for selective reporting, if not outright misconduct.”481 Steven Munch suggests that future
legislation should outline specific penalties for directors who “provide false
476

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(C).
See supra note 460 and accompanying text.
478
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a).
479
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(g). The statutes in Vermont, Virginia, Maryland,
and New Jersey contain the same definition.
480
Gupta, supra note 366, at 224 (questioning whether the third-party evaluations are
rigorous enough and whether self-evaluations pose risks of dishonest reporting); see also
Cummings, supra note 26, at 580, 611–13. The Vermont statute stands alone in vesting
benefit directors with the authority to retain an independent third party to audit the annual
benefit report or conduct social and environmental performance assessments. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(2).
481
Munch, supra note 78, at 194.
477
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or misleading information on the company’s social performance.”482 William
H. Clark, Jr., one of the drafters of benefit corporation legislation, counters
with several reasons for not mandating verification of ABRs. First, he notes
that doing so would impose additional costs on benefit corporations.483 Second, he argues that for-profit corporations are not required to have audited
financial reports, and by analogy, benefit corporations should not be required
to have audited ABRs.484 Clark addresses Munch’s concerns by noting that
directors of benefit corporations are already subject to suit for fraud if they
report false or misleading information in their benefit reports.485 He also argues that discretionary verification should remain available to certain benefit
corporations who wish to distinguish themselves and attract greater confidence in their social and environmental claims.486
Clark offers persuasive arguments against mandatory verification, but
that is not the only critique leveled at benefit corporations’ reporting requirements. For instance, the statutes do not provide any baseline for social or environmental performance, nor do they prescribe any particular
methodology or require a specific valuation metric against which a benefit
corporation’s social and environmental performance should be assessed.
Clark responds by noting that unlike financial metrics, reliable industry
standards for measuring social and environmental performance do not exist, but “[p]resumably, armed with the information included in the annual
benefit report and the statutory requirements with respect to a third-party
standard, market forces will shape the landscape of third-party standards
utilized by benefit corporations.”487 Although this approach stands in stark
contrast to CR reporting, the effectiveness of this particular mixture of
third-party standards without verification or baselines remains to be seen.
d. Variations in the Statutes
In his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,488 Justice
Louis Brandeis famously observed that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”489 Legislatures in several states have served as
482

Id.
Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 846.
484
Id. at 847.
485
Id.
486
Id.
487
Id. at 846.
488
285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
489
Id. at 311.
483
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laboratories for benefit corporation legislation, and it comes as no surprise
that states continue to build upon previous legislation by introducing unique
provisions for their respective corporate codes. In an effort to provide a deeper understanding of this quickly developing legal landscape, this Section identifies several variations and unique features of benefit corporation statutes.
The Benefit Director. Eight states—Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, New
Jersey, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont—and
the District of Columbia have adopted the requirement that benefit corporations designate an independent “benefit director” to sit on the board.490 These provisions largely mirror each other.491 In general, the benefit director
has all the “powers, duties, rights, and immunities of the other directors of
the benefit corporation,”492 and is elected and may be removed by the same
procedures applicable to other directors.493 The benefit director’s primary
responsibility is preparing the ABR.494 All nine jurisdictions require benefit
directors to include statements in the ABR addressing whether the benefit
corporation fulfilled its general and specific goals, whether the directors and
officers acted in accordance with their duty to consider stakeholder interests, and, if the benefit corporation failed in either of these two respects, a
description of those failures.495 Much like the other directors, benefit directors are shielded from personal liability “for any act or omission taken in his
or her official capacity.”496
Benefit Officers. The same nine jurisdictions also permit the selection of
a “benefit officer.”497 Unlike benefit directors, however, the selection of a

490

See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(A) (2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(A) (2012); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (2012).
491
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7; D.C. CODE § 29-1303.2 (2013).
492
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822.
493
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(b); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(B); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-7(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(b).
494
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1822(C); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-7; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-410(C); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(1).
495
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(c)(3)–(4).
496
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10(f). These
statutes contain the usual exceptions for “intentional misconduct,” “a knowing violation of
[the] law,” and “self-dealing.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7(e); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.10(f); S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52.11(a) (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a) (2012).
497
HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-9(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(A); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-9; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-430(A); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12; S.B. 2897,
97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
238, § 52.11(a); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a).
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benefit officer is left to the board’s discretion.498 Benefit corporations may
have an independent benefit officer specifically charged with the management of the benefit corporation relating to the creation of the general or specific public benefits.499 In almost all cases, when a benefit officer is selected, he or she bears the statutory responsibility for preparing the ABR.500
The California and Virginia statutes do not expressly authorize the
benefit officer position. However, in most cases,501 regardless of designation, officers of benefit corporations enjoy the same duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as directors. For example, the Virginia statute contains a general provision stating that officers “shall have no liability” for
actions taken that the officer believes, in his “good faith business judgment,” agree with the general or specific public benefits of the corporation
and are consistent with any third-party standards then in effect.502 Other
states, like California, Vermont, and New Jersey, include more detailed
officer liability provisions. These states require each officer of a benefit
corporation to consider both shareholder and stakeholder interests when
(1) “[t]he officer has discretion to act with respect to a matter” or (2) it
reasonably appears that the matter “may have a material effect” on the
creation of general or specific public benefits or any stakeholder interests.503 Thus officers, as well as directors, are under an additional duty to
consider stakeholder interests, but they are shielded from liability in decision-making circumstances.504
498

See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12 (“A benefit corporation may have an
officer designated the ‘benefit officer’ ....” (emphasis added)).
499
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-9(a)–(b).
500
See id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1824(B)(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-9; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-38-430(B)(3).
501
The Maryland statute does not acknowledge or address the issue of officers of
benefit corporations.
502
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-789 (2012). One might term this approach the “third-party
business judgment” standard insofar as its conjunctive language appears to cloak officers’
decisions under the veil of the business judgment rule, so long as those decisions are
consistent with third-party standards. Id. (“An officer of a benefit corporation shall have
no liability for actions [that] ... are consistent with (i) the general public benefit ... and (ii)
the requirements of any third-party standard then in effect.”) (emphasis added)).
503
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14622(a)(1)–(2) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-8(a)–
(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.11.
504
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14622(b) (providing that an officer’s consideration of
stakeholder interests shall not constitute a violation of the officer’s duties); id. § 14622(c)
(shielding officers from liability for money damages for any action taken under this section
or failure to create a general or specific public benefit); id. § 14622(d) (explicitly denying a
right of action to stakeholders or beneficiaries of the public benefits against officers of
benefit corporations).
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The Benefit Enforcement Proceeding. Nine states—California, Louisiana, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Vermont—and the District of Columbia provide for a special
right of action against benefit corporations—namely, a benefit enforcement
proceeding (BEP).505 A BEP is a limited right of action available to shareholders, directors, or any other persons that may be specified in the articles of
incorporation.506 In most cases, standing to bring a BEP is also granted to
persons or groups who own at least 5%507 of the equity interest in a benefit
corporation’s parent corporation.508 In most states, BEPs are limited to claims
against directors or officers for failure to pursue the general or specific public
benefit purpose of the corporation or violation of a duty or standard of conduct.509 California adds “failure of the benefit corporation to deliver or post
an annual benefit report as required by Section 14630” to this list of preapproved BEP claims.510
The New York and Maryland statutes do not create any special right of
action against benefit corporations. While these statutes fail to mention BEPs,
benefit corporations incorporated in these jurisdictions are still subject to the
provisions of their respective corporate codes.511 Therefore, shareholders have
standing to bring derivative suits alleging breach of fiduciary duties or violations of standards of conduct.512 Because directors of benefit corporations
are under an additional duty to consider stakeholder interests, shareholders
505

CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1825(B); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-10(b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-440(C) (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.13(b); S.B. 2897, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012) (effective Jan. 1, 2013);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 238, § 52.11(a) (2012); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3322(a) (2012).
506
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(a) to (b)(2)(d); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
11A, § 21.13(b)(1)–(4).
507
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(c), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 21.13(b)(3), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b)(2)(C), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38440(C)(2)(c). The former require a 10% equity interest in the parent corporation, while
the latter require only a 5% interest to trigger the right to a BEP.
508
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)(2)(c); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b)(3).
509
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(c).
510
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3). Hawaii’s statute is less clear. It does not set forth any
special right of action against Benefit Corporations, but rather provides in general terms that
shareholders and directors have the right to bring derivative claims “to enforce corporate
purposes and the standards for directors ... [and] to enforce the general or specific public
benefit purposes” of the corporation. HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-10 (2012). Thus, while not
explicitly providing for a BEP, the Hawaii statute appears to infer the existence of a limited
right of action available only to directors and shareholders.
511
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-02 (LexisNexis 2012); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 1701 (McKinney 2012).
512
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 720.
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in states that do not provide for a special right of action vis-à-vis a BEP may
still pursue a traditional derivative action alleging a violation of that duty.513
Public Comment. The public comment requirement is unique to the
Hawaiian statute. Before publishing its final ABR, a Hawaiian “sustainable
business corporation” is required to “post a draft of its benefit report on the
public section of its website, or make it otherwise available to the public, for
a sixty-day public comment period.”514 Directors of benefit corporations are
required to consider stakeholder interests in business decisions, but only
those incorporated under the laws of Hawaii are required to include stakeholders and the general public in the drafting of the ABR.
Forfeiture of Social Enterprise Corporate Status. The potential forfeiture of benefit corporation status is a feature unique to the New Jersey statute. Benefit corporations registered in New Jersey are required to submit a
copy of their ABR, along with a $70.00 filing fee, to the Department of the
Treasury on an annual basis.515 In the event a benefit corporation fails to file
an ABR for two consecutive years,516 the Department of the Treasury is
granted the authority to file a statement that the benefit corporation has forfeited its status and is no longer subject to the act.517 However, the forfeiture
can be remedied by filing an ABR with the Department of the Treasury,
triggering automatic reinstatement of benefit corporation status.518 Nevertheless, potential loss of operating power and benefit corporation status pose
significant deterrents to potential violators.
F. Conclusion
The four new entities discussed in this Part constitute the first generation of entities in the social enterprise revolution in U.S. corporate law.
They remain, by and large, untested corporate forms with high aspirations
and varying approaches to finding an effective blend of corporate purposes. The success of the L3C may depend in large part on the effectiveness
of the recently proposed IRS regulations to allay tax risks with respect to
PRIs. The FPC offers the interesting option of serving either charitable or
513

Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 850 (emphasizing that while BEPs grant shareholders an expanded right of action, the duty to consider stakeholder interests does not require
a particular outcome of the directors’ decision-making).
514
HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b). Note, however, that the Hawaiian “sustainable
business corporation,” while bearing a different name than the benefit corporation, appears to
be a distinction without a difference as the statute mirrors other benefit corporation statutes.
515
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1) (West 2012).
516
Id. § 14A:18-11(d)(2).
517
Id.
518
Id.
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blended-value purposes, but vague drafting and unprecedented grants of
limited liability may risk doing more harm than good to the social enterprise movement. The SPC, with its introduction of the anti-Revlon declaration, is a significant step away from shareholder wealth maximization. However, the lack of third-party standards for reporting requirements remains a
legitimate accountability concern for the SPC form. Finally, there is the benefit corporation. It offers the most specific list of public benefits and a catchall provision enabling entrepreneurs to pursue a limitless number of specific
social and environmental benefits, while still requiring the overall pursuit
of a general public benefit. Benefit directors and other officers enjoy limited liability, but they are under a duty to consider stakeholder interests
when making business decisions, which is made enforceable through the
BEP. All ABRs must meet minimum content requirements and must be assessed against independent, third-party standards measuring social and environmental performance.
In light of the above analysis, the benefit corporation emerges as the
most promising corporate entity. On paper, it appears to combine an appropriate mixture of specifically defined social or environment corporate purposes, transparency, accountability, flexibility, and limited liability for social entrepreneurs.519 This might explain why, on the morning of January 3,
2012, several CEOs, including Yvon Chouinard of Patagonia,520 lined up outside the Secretary of State’s office to file their reincorporation papers and become benefit corporations.521 The next Part will first address some critiques
519

See Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 851 (concluding that the benefit corporation
“is the most comprehensive, yet flexible legal entity devised to address the needs of
entrepreneurs and investors, and ultimately, the general public”).
520
Marc Lifsher, Firms File for Do-Good Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at B1, B4.
Yvon Chouinard explained: “Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework to
enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession,
capital raises and even changes in ownership by institutionalizing the values, culture,
processes and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.” Id. at B4. Patagonia,
already well known for its environmental commitments, was the first major company to
adopt the benefit corporation form in California. Firms with Benefits: A New Sort of
Caring, Sharing Company Gathers Momentum, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www
.economist.com/node/21542432. Following Patagonia, Sun Light & Power and King Arthur
Flour became benefit corporations, demonstrating the entity’s adoption across industry
lines. See About Us, SUN LIGHT & POWER, http://sunlightandpower.com/about/#136 (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013); see also About: Social Responsibility, KING ARTHUR FLOUR, http://
www.kingarthurflour.com/about/social-responsibility.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
521
Lifsher, supra note 522, at B1; see also Alex Goldmark, Twelve California
Companies Seize the Moment to Become Benefit Corporations, GOOD (Jan. 3, 2012, 12:00
PM), http://www.good.is/post/eighteen-california-companies-seize-the-moment-to-become
-benefit-corporations/.

708

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:639

of the benefit corporation, and then make the case for the benefit corporation
as the most appropriate vehicle for the social enterprise movement.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
A. Responding to the “Social Business” Critique
Perhaps the most outspoken critic of blended value approaches to social
enterprise is, surprisingly, Muhammad Yunus, the father of the microcredit
industry. Yunus became a Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2006 for his work
advancing a “social business” model aimed at alleviating poverty.522 He
goes to great lengths to distinguish his term “social business” as a specific
subset of the broader social enterprise movement.523
Yunus presents three arguments against the blended value approaches
gaining momentum in the U.K. and the United States. First, Yunus makes a
moral argument, contending that it is inherently immoral to make a profit
from the poor, and that this constitutes “benefiting from the suffering of our
fellow human beings.”524 Yunus uses examples from his experience in the
microcredit arena525 and, admittedly, within the confines of this limited context, his moral argument is very strong.
However, the argument fails to hold water when applied to social enterprises engaging in other social or environmental goals. Take, for example,
Solar Works, a California benefit corporation that provides full-service solar
panel design and installation.526 Alternatively, consider Clay.com, a New
York benefit corporation that provides a social marketplace of second-hand
items that raises money for local communities.527 Neither of these benefit
corporations directly addresses poverty, but both still strive to achieve specific environmental or social benefits in their respective communities. These
examples show how Yunus’s definition of social business narrows its focus
to traditionally charitable issues—namely, poverty—and reflects how social
business is much more akin to European social cooperatives than American
social enterprise entities.

522

The Nobel Peace Prize 2006, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.nobel
prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html.
523
YUNUS, supra note 2, at 12 (emphasizing that social business is a “new category”
of business).
524
Id. at 13.
525
Id. at 13–14.
526
See SOLARWORKS, http://www.solarworksca.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
527
CLAY, http://www.clay.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
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Yunus also contends that “[i]n times of stress, profit will always trump
the other ‘bottom lines.’”528 He argues that blended-value approaches create
confusion for board members over how to balance those goals,529 and that
where confusion arises, profits will almost always win over social goals,
which will “fade in importance.”530 In contrast, he explains that there is no
balancing of contradictory objectives involved in a social business because
every business decision is measured by whether it will enable the business
“to provide the greatest possible benefit to society,”531 and in this sense it is
guided by its primarily charitable purpose.
Instead of avoiding tension between profit and purpose, most emerging
entities invite this conflict with open arms and attempt to insulate those making holistic business decisions from personal liability.532 This is a much different approach to Yunus’s social business model, but the fact that these entities require consideration of non-shareholder interests is a significant step
away from the single bottom-line, shareholder-centric model of corporate
governance. Furthermore, Yunus’s argument overlooks the possibility that
certain entities, like benefit corporations, permit the founders to enshrine the
primacy of one or more stakeholder interests above others, thus giving directors a more tangible yardstick by which to measure their decisions.
Lastly, Yunus makes a systemic argument, contending that social business is necessary to create “a clearly defined alternative ... in order to
change mindsets, reshape economic structures, and encourage new forms of
thinking.”533 This argument is compelling,534 but the momentous economic
restructuring it envisions will not occur overnight. It may be that the eventual success of Yunus’s social business model is necessarily dependent on
the organic development of smaller, incremental shifts towards stakeholderinclusive governance models. The imposition of an enforceable duty to consider stakeholder interests, for example, represents a significant step in this
direction. In this sense, blended value entities like the benefit corporation
may represent stepping stones to Yunus’s social business.535
528

YUNUS, supra note 2, at 14 (arguing that in practice, CEOs tend to “lean—perhaps
unconsciously—in favor of profit, and exaggerate the social benefits being created”).
529
Id. (“The idea of a ‘mixed’ company offers no clear guidance ....”).
530
Id.
531
Id. at 15.
532
Clark & Babson, supra note 14, at 840–41, 848–49.
533
YUNUS, supra note 2, at 16.
534
Id. (“Social business is about totally delinking from the old framework of
business—not accommodating new objectives within the existing framework.”).
535
Id. at 1. (“[Type I social business] is a non-loss, non-dividend company devoted to
solving a social problem and owned by investors who reinvest all profits in expanding and
improving the business.”).
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B. The Valuation Problem
Some commentators highlight the problem of valuing a corporation’s social and environmental impacts, observing that a failure to agree upon metrics
for such impacts stifles the growth of investments in social enterprise.536 These critiques continue to be made despite the fact that several organizations, in
addition to B Labs, infra, have promulgated assessment tools.537 For example: the Center for Sustainable Organization’s (CSO) Social Footprint,538 the
Roberts Enterprise Development Fund’s Ongoing Assessment of Social ImpactS (OASIS);539 New Profit, Inc.’s Balance Scorecard;540 the Social Return
On Investment (SROI);541 the ISO2600;542 and, most prominently, the Global
Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) G3 Guidelines.543
This is an area in which the failures of CR reporting can creep into the
new ground being broken by social enterprise entities. CSI’s Social Footprint
is one of the few assessment tools that attempts to provide a mathematical
calculation of “anthro capital” to generate a value representing a social bottom line.544 This is a promising development, but by no means a silver bullet.
The reality is that the financial industry possesses myriad tools for measuring
a company’s financial value, but has only begun to explore different methods
for valuing a corporation’s social and environmental impacts and benefits.
Social enterprise’s biggest challenge will be to fashion new and innovative
metrics for measuring social and environmental benefits.545
536

Snyder, supra note 103, at 586 (“There have been recent efforts to quantify social
impact. Examination of such efforts affirms initial intuitions and illustrates that given the
nature of the issues, the reports are inherently ambiguous.”).
537
See generally List of Standards, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.
net/selecting-a-third-party-standard/list-of-standards (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
538
The Social Footprint Method, CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE ORGS., http://www.sust
ainableorganizations.org/the-social-footprint.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); see also
Snyder, supra note 103, at 586.
539
See generally Fay Twersky & BTW Consultants, An Information OASIS: The Design
and Implementation of Comprehensive and Customized Client Information and Tracking
Systems, REDF (2002), http://www.redf.org/learn-from-redf/publications/121.
540
Rob Wherry, The Matchmaker, FORBES, Dec. 23, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/forbes
/2002/1223/338_print.html (“The key to New Profit is its scorecard, which rates a nonprofit
on a series of financial and other sorts of benchmarks.”).
541
See The SROI Guide, THE SROI NETWORK, http://www.thesroinetwork.org/sroi-anal
ysis/the-sroi-guide (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
542
See ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, ISO (2010), http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_cat
alogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/iso26000.
543
See G3 Guidelines, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org
/reporting/latest-guidelines/g3-guidelines/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2013); see
also Snyder, supra note 103, at 586–91 (providing an overview of the GRI G3 Guidelines).
544
The Social Footprint Method, supra note 538; see also Snyder, supra note 103, at 592.
545
See Doeringer, supra note 254, at 323 (suggesting increasing investments in research and
development of valuation metrics that accurately account for the impact of social enterprise).
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C. Benefit Corporations Going Forward
This Article has argued that, in comparison to the other emerging corporate entities currently available to social entrepreneurs, the benefit corporation most effectively blends profit with social and environmental goals,
and accountability with flexibility. But the benefit corporation’s strongest
competition going forward may not be the new entities discussed above,
but rather546 the already popular and notoriously flexible limited liability
company (LLC).547 Proponents of the LLC, like Anne E. Conaway, argue
that the LLC can better accommodate the blended-value goals that benefit
corporations seek to achieve.548 They contend that the benefit corporation
imposes additional costs in comparison to LLCs.549 For example, in states
that require independent benefit directors to sit on the board, the benefit
corporation is obliged to search for and pay a salary to that individual.550
Additionally, LLC proponents emphasize that benefit corporation statutes
muddy the waters of fiduciary duties, and that a carefully tailored LLC
agreement can more specifically delineate directors’ fiduciary duties to an
organization and its members.551 Lastly, the LLC generally qualifies as a
“pass through” entity for federal income tax purposes, whereas the benefit
corporation offers no relief from the traditional corporate entity tax.552
These are perhaps the most compelling arguments against the benefit
corporation, and addressing them substantively should be the polestar for
future drafting and policy decisions. The following offers some suggestions
in the hopes of sparking a conversation about the future of the benefit corporation and its role in the social enterprise movement.
1. Statutory Reform
There are several areas in which state legislatures can improve upon the
first generation of statutes currently on the books. Lawmakers can require
546

Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative
Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44, 45 (1991) (“[The LLC] is a hybrid form of business
created by combining the organizational and tax attributes of partnerships and corporations
....” (emphasis added)).
547
Anne E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 780 (2012) (“The thesis of this
article is that, presently, the Delaware LLC provides global investors maximum internal
efficiency, as well as asset protection at a decreased agency cost, for businesses operating
solely within or outside the United States for socially-driven purposes.”).
548
Id. at 801.
549
Reiser, supra note 17, at 608.
550
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (2012).
551
See Conaway, supra note 547, at 801–02, 816.
552
See Geu, supra note 546, at 45.
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that the independent, third-party reporting standard produce some metric
for measuring an organization’s social and environmental impacts. Permitting benefit corporations to select third-party standards such as the GRI
Guidelines or other standards that lack qualitative methodology does nothing more than require what 95% of the world’s largest corporations already
engage in—public relations moonlighting as corporate social responsibility. If states are willing to hand over the enforcement reins to third-party
standard setters, they should at minimum require that those standards use
some objective calculus to give numerical values to a benefit corporation’s
social and environmental benefits. Doing so would produce two results for
benefit corporations: first, it would effectively address methodological shortcomings of CR reporting; second, it would prevent a race to the bottom
amongst third-party standard setters. Most important, it would encourage
the creation of new valuation metrics and force those already engaged in
standard setting to pursue more robust methodologies. Once acceptable
methodologies are in place, lawmakers might set minimum requirements
for social and environmental performance that benefit corporations must
meet in order to maintain their corporate status.
To the extent that lawmakers are uncomfortable with turning over the
lion’s share of regulatory authority to independent third parties, they might
also consider adopting a public participation provision like that in the Hawaiian statute. Costs associated with permitting public comment are marginal, and yet this simple step opens a dialogue between communities served
by benefit corporations, and it may strengthen ties with stakeholder groups
whose interests benefit corporations are under a duty to consider. While requiring a period for public comment may provide another layer of enforcement, the effectiveness of this approach relies on the ABR being assessed
against objective third-party standards in the first place.
New Jersey’s forfeiture of social enterprise status provision553 offers
additional regulation of the ABR. However, this approach requires a greater
degree of government oversight and involvement than other benefit corporation statutes that leave enforcement to the shareholders by way of the
BEP.554 Theoretically, the threat of derivative suits for failure to prepare an
ABR is sufficient to ensure that such reports are distributed and made public.
However, to prevent unscrupulous business practices that seek to use the
good will of the benefit corporation brand to defraud consumers, a simple
forfeiture of status provision may provide a necessary regulatory floor.
The author suggests that future benefit corporation statutes adopt an element of the SPC statute—namely, the anti-Revlon “mission statement”
553
554

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(d)(1).
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2012).
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providing: “The mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily
compatible with and may be contrary to maximizing profits and earnings
for shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger, acquisition, or other similar actions of the corporation,” to supplement the
benefit corporation’s purpose of “creating a general public benefit,” and to
make clear that—in all business decisions—directors are free to choose not
to maximize profits.
Finally, some commentators have suggested that requiring only one benefit director on the board is insufficient, particularly in larger organizations.555
Steven Munch suggests that future legislation “require benefit corporations
to enlist additional benefit directors as they grow and, once they reach a certain size, to organize full benefit committees as part of their boards.”556
2. Tax Credits
Another method to foster the growth of benefit corporations, and social
enterprise in general, is to provide tax credits for these organizations. As
several commentators have pointed out, benefit corporations and other social enterprise entities receive no preferential tax treatment,557 and they argue that tax credits offer a practical counterweight to the added burden
borne by the entities’ commitment to socially and environmental responsible business practices.558 Because benefit corporation directors are given the
discretion to de-prioritize shareholder wealth maximization, they may very
well reap a lower return on investment.559 Tax credits could prove especially helpful for start-ups seeking seed-stage funding.
Some local jurisdictions have already enacted such tax credits. The city of
Philadelphia recently introduced a Sustainable Business Tax Credit, effective
through 2017.560 Certified B Corporations located in Philadelphia are eligible
555

Munch, supra note 78, at 193.
Id.
557
See, e.g., Ajulo Othow, Benefits Corporations: A New Way to Balance Values and
Profits, RAPPAPORT BRIEFING (Sept. 8, 2012), http://rappaportbriefing.net/2012/09/08/bene
fits-corporations-a-new-way-to-balance-values-and-profits/ (“Benefits [sic] corporations also
differ from non-profit organizations whose operators and donors rely on significant tax
advantages to encourage giving to fund their programs. Benefits corporations have no such
tax advantages; they must instead maintain a viable for-profit model to stay in business.”).
558
See Munch, supra note 78, at 188 (noting that this approach has caused mixed
reactions in the United States).
559
See id.
560
City of Philadelphia Bus. Servs., Credits, Grants, & Other Incentives, CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA, https://business.phila.gov/pages/taxcreditsotherincentives.aspx (last visited
Mar. 23, 2013). There have also been rumors that Portland, Oregon, and Washington, D.C.,
will grant tax breaks to certified B Corporations; see also Gupta, supra note 366, at 225.
556
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to be classified as sustainable businesses and receive a tax credit of $4000.561
Other government incentives for benefit corporations are also being proposed.
For example, in San Francisco, Bill No. 120082 would amend the San Francisco Administrative Code to give California benefit corporations additional
points in the system the city uses for bidding contracts.562 While prospects of
federal tax relief for benefit corporations remain uncertain, state and local
governments can take steps to foster social enterprise in their areas by adopting tax credits or preferred government contract status.
CONCLUSION
This Article has illustrated the effects of the global social enterprise
movement on corporate law in Europe and the United States. In doing so,
the Article has drawn a stark contrast between the European and American
approaches, and it has emphasized that the emerging entities associated
with these approaches lie along a surprisingly broad spectrum, from social
cooperatives that operate like traditional charities to for-profit FPC’s with
unprecedented protection for directors and their business judgment. The
Article argues that the benefit corporation is the most promising entity for
social entrepreneurs. While benefit corporations may be the most desirable
of this first generation of social enterprises, whether they provide sufficient benefits to overcome the strong preference for LLCs remains debatable. Likewise, the uncertainty surrounding the ability of third-party standards to prevent selective reporting and foster accurate valuation metrics
for social and environmental performance continues to impede progress.
Despite these problems, one cannot overlook the consistent growth in
investments in social enterprise. Increased financial support and the continued experimentation with a growing list of entities designed specifically
for social entrepreneurs are necessary for continued progress. Indeed, these
trends should give social entrepreneurs reason to hope for a future that includes a thriving economic sector offering accurate valuation metrics and
efficient corporate entities that allow business to be used as a tool for social and environmental good.
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City of Philadelphia Business Services, supra note 560. However, no more than
twenty-five sustainable businesses may receive the tax credit in any one tax year. Id.
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